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PREFACE 
The 1957 Phili-Jpine election witnes sed the emer gence and use of wide-
range :_Jolitica~ public relations. Never in the history of Philiipine 
pol itics h~s public relations pl ayed such .a great role and importance. 
The pre ent study concerns a content analysis and evaluation of the ublic 
rela tions >mrk of one firm. It is hoped that from the study of this 
particular firm which c~~ be regarded to t ypify other pr esent public 
relations firms in the Philippines, the over-all contemporary pictur e 
of poli tical public relations in the count r>J will be depicted. 
To afford an insight of t he political public relat ion s picture in the 
United States, the thesis includes a study of the public relations work 
behind the U.S. senatorial election in 1950. 
When I started my research on this subj ect, I was aware of the fugitive 
nature of many of the materials on which the study would depend. .As I 
plunged deeper into the subject, I found that the fugitivene ss of it 
excelled my expectations. Letters , interviews, and most important of all, 
documents from private files have had to supplement published sources. 
To Romeo D. Quiambao of the Asian International Advertisers, Inc . and 
Chronicle Broadcasting Netrrork, who w·ent out of his 1-:ray to send the 
necessar-y materials for this study and who dug for the vi tal but confident-
ial facts, the author is greatly indebted. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
I. 
Arumber of persons hel ped 1d th advice and suggestions during the pre:par a-
tion of this paper. To Dr. Otto Lerbinger of the School of Public Rela-
tions and Communications, Bos ton University, and Mr . Carlos F. Nivera, 
AIA Director , a note of gratitude for all the hel p they gave me in pre-
paring this t hesis. 
Boston University 
July .30, 1958 
L.H.G. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 4, 1946, the Republic of the Philippines was inagurated amid the 
ruins of var-torn Manila. 
Elections '{ere held on April 23, 1946 for President and Vice-President and 
for members of congress and on November 11, 1947 f or eight senators. 
The Li beral ~nd Nacionalista Parties are off shoots of the former Partido 
Nacionalista to which former Commonwealth Presidents Manuel Quezon and 
Sergio Osmena belonged. 
In J anuary, 1946, this party split into a conservative -vling known as the 
Nacionalista Party, led by Sergio Osmena and a Liberal 1dng headed by the 
late General Ivlanuel Roxas, 1-rho was then president of the Sena t e . 
I 
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Besides the Liberal and Naci onalista Parties, there are the Citizens Party 1 
led by Senator Lorenzo Tanada and the Demo'cratic Party which was created 
by General Romulo 1{hen he and his follovrers walked out of the Liberal 
Party convention of 1953. Last year's elections sm-T the emergence of 
another party - the Progressive Party of the Philippines . There are I 
also in existence political groups of lesser importance which tend to Jj 
polarize around the t Ho ma jor parties accor ding to political exigencies. 
Political campaigns vrere loosely or ganized and mainly delved in rabble-
rousing techniques. Candidates tried to outspe~l.c, outpromise each other. 
Little wa s known or heard about political public relations in the 
II 
Philippines until the extensive public relations work of Col. Edvrard 
Lansdale was l aunched for Ramon Magsaysay during the 1952 presidential 
elections . The Magsaysay ca~paign planted a new seed in Philippine 
political ca111.pai gning. The masses saw a different politician. Here Has 
a man 1-rho was not a s stodgy as other politicians, one vrho took time to 
tal.lc their problems >-ri th them, one 1-rho mingled 1-ri th them in their shabby 
shacks and shook their dirty hands . Magsaysay 1 s vi ctory ;.ras over'l-rhelming. 
He defeated his opponent by more than a million votes . 
,. 
II 
This i gni ted the need for political publi c relations in the country and 
~Jublic relations firms have been spr i nging up ever since to f ill this need. I 
T e newest to come up was t he Asian International Advertisers , Inc •• It 
vras e t ab1ished in 1955 , and in the 1957 election undertoo~ its first big 
assi gnment . It ca~paigned for a senatorial candidate - Os car Ledesma. 
The central concern of this study is a content anal ysis and evaluation of 
the oner c tions of the AIA during the ele ction. Campaign material will 
be broken down into different categor i e s such as literatur e, news releases, 
speeches , radio broadcasts, and TV telecasts . Each category will be 
trea ted separately and a content analysis Hill be ern~ loyed on each. 
The analy ses are expected to b~lng out the t ype of appeals used, whether 
the sa~e themes were phrased and rephrased, inte~-roven and reitera ted; 
the t y-pes of speeches, literature, advertising, neHs releases, radio 
broadcast s , and TV telecasts - and the relative vreight given to these 
various media. 
II 
Attention will be iven as to whether the public rel a t i ons work of fered 
definite reasons to the voting :public as to w"hy it should vote for its 
candidate - and ho it ,., nt about d.rummin these reasons . Di d it cons i s t 
of mere 11mudslinging11 a gainst opponents or i-TaS it mor e of a general , con-
structive personality play-up? How did i t handle the distribution of 
ca.'llpaign li teratu.re? Did it pa- special attention in 1dnni ng opi nion 
l eaders to their side? 
Then, study of the political public relations vrork behind the 1950 
United States senatorial election w~ll be tak en up . From thi s study, t he 
1igh~i Jhts of the _olitical public relations operations of both countries 
vdl l be compa red . The comparison is expected to pin-point the short-
comings of AIA 1 s public relations work, to note down definite points 
which have been found to be eff ective in American Political Public Rela-
tions. Then these good points will be evaluated as to which of them 
could successfully be adapted to t he local scene. 
Recent studies on political behav-ior have indicated that t he act of 
voting can well be used as a paradigm f or many other activitie s; that the 
decisions the modern man makes every feli years in the political area ar e 
similar t o tho se he makes everday as a consumer of goods and services. 
.3 . 
From the results of the analyses , t hi s study 1-rill undertake to investigate 
whet her the results sup!ort the supposedly relat ionship and similari ty 
of political campaigns and coifl.mercial advertisi ng. It vrill note vrhether 
the public relations fi:rm being studied, molded public opinion and sold 
i ts political candidate by means of the same technioues Hhich sel l soc..p 
and cars. 
====-===::...;==-
CB..APTER II 
l'1ETHOD AND MATERIALS 
Due to their confidential nature, there were some difficulties encountered 
in gettirghold of the material analysed in t his study . AIA ' s director 
was at first reluctant to give away the strategies and tactics which the 
firm employed in its campaign for Ledesma. 
I 
Steady correspondence with the firm had to be ke~t up before, duri ng and II 
after the elections . In some instances, telegrams and long-distance cal l s 
to t he Philippines had to be made to clarify some of the strategies and 
t actics used - and to learn their effectiveness . 
The writer soent the summer of 1957 back in the Phil i ppines and ~ hanging 
around AIA 1 s main headquarters in Manila vras able to observe closely and 
obtain first hand information with regard to the firm ' s main strategies 
and minute operations . 
To be able to pro be deeper, this had to be f ollorred 'td. th an interview with 
the Director who was in vJashington two months ago. The Director rras then 
l aying ground work President Garcia ' s trip to the United States . 
The following months , September, October, and Nove~ber witnessed t he 
hei ht of political campai gni ng . The >ITi ter ' s closes t fri end at t he AIA 
bore t he brunt of compiling and sending over every :iJnporte.nt AIA carrrpaign 
material. Because of the impossibility of sending over ever.J s ingl e piece 
of material due to mailing and filing obstacle s, the writer had to content 
hi.mself rri th the material, nu."'nbering 500 , 1-rhich the f riend \{aS able to get 
5. 
his ha.n.d on i~i. th the assurance that these material f o nna representative 
) 
samnle of over-all campaign vork that AIA performed . 
This material was broken down into the following categories: literature, 
neHs releases and newspaper advertising , radio, speeches, F_nd T. V. A 
content ~n.alysis was employed t o f ind out the r el ative emphasis pl a ced on 
each of t hem. 
In obtaining the per centage, the number of t imes a particular theme ifas 
:-11entioned i·<aS divided by t he total number of all thema5 and multipl i ed by 
100 . 
T:!:len a content analysis ~.-ras employed m each categor;:v to find out the 
thel!les stre \"sed in the particul ar ca tegories. It was not found necessary 
.~;· 
to t abul e.te ea ch analysis in a table of f i gures . Tho se categories i·rhich 
do not have any tables drum out only one ' central theme all throughout. Or 
if a category cont ained more than one th~~,the emphasis placed on them 
could easily be s een without actually setting t hem do1m in figures . The 
ca t egory that needed this t abulation was t he literatur e categoryk which 
Has t he broades t of all campaign material. AIA devo ted most of its time, 
and attention to this category and as such carri ed the most varied t hemes . 
The 1L'1i t of content analysis u sed in this s t udy 1ms t he the..rne. As Bernard 
Berel s on puts it: "The t heme is the most u s eful unit of content anal y s is , 
particularl y for the s tudy of the effedt of communica tions upon public 
opinion becaus e i t takes the form in which i ssu es and attitu~es are 
1 
usually discussed . 11 
1. Bernard Beren:son, Ne1-r York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), p . 139. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS o:F' CONT:Eli!T .AN.f..LY.SI S OF AI A 1 S OPERATIONS 
I N THE 1957 PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS 
One of t he s i gnificant high~i ghts in the 1957 Philip:pine Elections was the 
readiness of the various political parties to spend liberally for -w-ide 
ranging programs of political propaganda . 
It i s estimated that no les s than 5 million Has spent in var i ous forms 
of influencing oublic o:pini on. Every political pa.rty orga.nieati on 
possessed a public relations machine in its ha..11ds. Full use of the neHs-
papers, the r -".dio , mobile units, posters, brochures , and other printed 
literature, souvenirs, and gifts and in desperate cases, cash. 
AI A l ai d out its strategies and the t hemes i t uas going to pl ay up as it 
rolled u:p i ts sleeves f or the job of ' selling ' senatoria~ candidate 
Oscar Ledesma . Its main goal -vras to put Ledesma in the 1ri.nning list and, 
i f possible, make him top the list. The firm concentrated on i dentifying 
the candidate •ri th the l ate Presi dent Ramon Hagsaysay, a hallm-red name 
throughout the country; the candidate' s religious activities, moral , and 
public char a cter. It dre>-v a dividing line in the met hods of carrying 
its mes sage t o the public. 
These strategies and themes were integrated into political literature, 
neHspaper advertising and new releases , r adio and speeches. 
Taqle l shows hov t hese various communicat ion media 1-1ere utilized and the 
relative emphasis placed on them. 
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T.ABLES: 
Utilization of and relative weight given the various commm1ication media : 
Total - 500 
MEDIA % of Total 
Literature 
48 .4 242.0 
Brochures 
Leaflets Samule ballots 
Letters 
Posters 
Bills 
Stickers 
Newspapers 
Ne1-rs & Ne1,;-s-photo releases 23.0 115.0 
Pe~d advertising 1~ .• 8 74 .• 0 
37.8 189 .0 
F.ad-io 10.6 53.0 
Speeches 3. 2 16.0 
TV 0.0 .o 
TOTAL 100.0 % 500 
II 
II 
7 .I 
I, 
II 
II 
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A total number of 500 pieces of com.'llunication material was analy zed . 
The material was comprised of literatur e, neHs relee,ses and ne1-rs photo-
releases, paid advertising, radio, and speeches. This particular analysis 
revealed literature ranked highest >-ri th 48 .4% or 242.0 pieces of the 
total number in the analysis. This was followed closely by the use of 
newspapers with 37.8%. This was made up of news releases and news photo-
releases and paid nevspaper advertising . There were more ne'frs releases 
issued by the firm compared to the paid advertising it had. There were 
23.% news and photo-releases, 14.8% newspaper paid advertising. 
As sho"'!l by the table, radio uas used very l ittle, getting a mere 10.6% 
of the tote~. This was mainly spot announcements, mentioning of the 
candidate 's name and a brief resume, less than a minute, of some of his 
achievements or President 1-iagsaysay' s statement of him. Then there uere 
the radi o interviews which, although not sponsored by the firm, the firm 
had a great hand in getting the station to interview their candidate. 
The radio was used more as a preparatory medium for the electorate f or 
the campaign literature that was to get into their hands. It ·~-ras intended 
that by these spot annotmcements, the people would be encouraged to read 
more of vhat 'fras said briefly, to knmf more of the candidate. This 1..ras 
where the literature and press releases came into play. 
Speeches finished last "~th a mere 3. 2%. This is explained by the f act 
tbat the candidate prefered to deliver his speeches extemporaneousl y. .All 
the firm did vras to prepare figures and facts to be used in the speeches 
or to do plain research work for the speeches of the candidate . 
I
I 
I 
II I 
There was no atta~pt to use television for the obvious fact tha t very few 
people in the I slands own a set. There has not been any survey done to 
f ind out the definite percentage of the population that do m-m a set but 
it can be :ruug:b~y esti.~a.ted tha t l ess than 1% of the whole population 
(22 million) own sets and a great majority, if not all , of this are i n 
9 . 
Hanila. And to boot, there is still jus t one TV station in the Philipoines . 
I 
I 
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LITERATUP..E 
The main bulk of the firm' s operations Has the preparati on and writing 
material for campaign literature. Campaign literature was comprised of 
bii'ochures, leaflets , pos ters, billboard signs, lett ers, sam.ple ballots, 
and stickers. 
The se various pieces of li terattu-e carried sever al themes. Nevertheless, 
t hree themes s tand out among the rest in the pieces of literature. They 
are: Pr es i dent Hagsaysay 1 s testimony of t he candidate's honesty, the 
candidate 's religious activities and his leadership in various Catholic 
organi zations; and his former government posi tions and achievements. 
The name of the l a te Presi dent Nagsaysay prevailed t :bickly over the pre-
election atmosphere. Candidates of both parties tried their bes t to 
i dentify themselves with the revered president. AIA used extensi vely 
Presi dent Hagsaysay ' s tes timony of t heir candidate as a means of i dentify-
ing Ledesma with the president and a means of adding pres t ige to their 
candida.te. When President l.riagsaysay becEEne presi dent in 1953, he appointed 1 
Ledesma as Secretary of Commerce and Industry. During the course of bis 
service as secretary, Presi dent Magsaysay commented: "Secretary Ledesma 
is one of the most honest, sincere and dedicated public offici al s I have 
known. " 
~=~~---"'=-- ---
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This 1-ras :pl ayed up by the literatur e made by AIA. Almo st every piece of 
litera t ure darried this statement plus pictures of the candidate ~-rith the 
pr esident. Then, t here ,.;rere also the lis ting of the candidate ' s accom-
pli sh..ments as a member of the Magaaysay cabinet. Everything 'as . done to 
l ink the late presi dent ' s name with the C8ndidate. Every s i ngle connection 
or incident of the candidate with the president, no matter how trivial 1-ras 
pl ayed up. 
The philippines being predominantly Catholic (80% of the population) the 
candidates of course focus their attention upon getting the Cat holic vote. 
This has been the trend in recent elections that critics have been increas-
i~y alarmed on the use of religion in the elections and in politics as 
\·Tell. 
President Garcia himself expressed opposition to Hhat he called religious 
regimentat ion in politics. Catholics should not vote blindlY as they 
are told by the leaders of the Catholic church, he pointed out ~ A man 
should vote for the candidates of t his own choice. Let the leaders of the 
cburch vote too, according to their best j udgement, but they should not 
i...11pose their political vie1-1s on all Catholics. 
Ho1-1ever, when told that the Catholic hierarchy had decided to support the 
Nacionalista party in the elections, the President eA.'Pressed no obj ection 
2 
and instead said : 11 If t hat i s true , them I would be very happy, " 
The claL11 of the Liberals that 32 out of 38 archbish 0ps and bishops and 
95% of the :priests of the Catholic church were for candidate Yulo ex-
2 . Free Press, 'The use of t he Church' - Sept. 7, 1957. 
ll. 
ploded on the eve of the elections like t he Hiroshima atomic bomb. I t was 
discovered when the Naci onalista party workers came upon handbills bei ng 
distributed in t he Catholic churches by t he Liheral Party -vro rker s . 
After announcing the number of bishops and pries t s supporting Mr . Yulo , 
t he ha.ndbill s added, "The Catholic church '1-Tould want Yulo to be the next 
Pr esident to safeguard our Holy l'·Iother Church. You are urged t o see your 
3 
Cat holi c uarish priest i 11rrnedia tely to confirm t his . 11 
The Naci onalis t a camp quickly jumped into action. It obtai ned statements 
f rom t wo ranking Catholic hierarchs , Papal Nunci o Egidio Vagnoz zi and 
Bishop Maraino Hadriaga of the Lingayen-Dagupan diocese, denying the 
Liberal' s claim. 
The Papal Nuncio declared the l eaflet s 1 content.s "without evidence or 
foundation in f act and do not come from any authorized ecclesiast i cal 
sources ." The Pangasinan bishop called their author s "liars and childr en 
of t he devil." 
The attempt to drag the church into politics and government i s evident. 
This also includes t he danger of dragging politics and goverruaent into the 
church. But the ca..ndidates silnpl y cannot close their eyes to t he fact 
t hat 80% of the population i s Catholi c and to Hin their support would 
almost 1d thout fail win them the electi on. 
Actually the Catholic hierarchy had six candidates (mi xed): Ledema, 
Hernandez, Pmentel, Estrada, Mangl apus and Padi lla . 
3 - Sunday Times Hagazine-11P0 st- Election Probl ems"-Dec. 15, 1957 
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Another main theme drummed by AlA in the recent election vras directed to 
the Catholic voter. Its literature emphasized Ledesma's Catholi c activi-
ties end Pis being a Catholic leader. 
A leaflet listing Ledesma's Catholic Record vras issued out. All his pre-
vious and present activities that are connected -vrith the church w·ere 
steted. He was described as a model Catholic, a devoted femily man "has 
nine children, two of 1-.rhom are married, loves to play with his grand-
children, and ahrays finds time to be with his family in spite of heavy 
business and official schedules. 11 
Pieces of literature also carried pictures of the candidate in his 
afluence vrith the pope, or his receiving the papal award in 1950 "for his 
meritorious service to the Catholic Church." 
d 
II 
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Among the major Catholic activities listed were: Personal Eissar-.r : Presi dent 
I 
Garcie's personal emissary to his holiness Pope Pius XII to extend greet-
ings of the Republic. 
knight of St. Sykvester 
knight of Columbus, .4.th degree 
President of the Columbian Fanners' Aid Association, Inc. for the l ast 
5 years. (CFAA is active Rural Altxiliary of the K of C wi th nation-wide 
I membership and activities, promoting home industries, community develop-
II 
I· 
'I 
ment programs, medical aid clinics, better f anning methods, community 
assemblies, and milk feeding projects.) 
II 
Connnl.ttee in the successful fund raising drive of Catholic Charities in ~~ 
56-57. 
Appointed by Archbishop Santos as Chairman of Sustaining Membership 
~-----= 
13. 
Co-Chairman, Solicitat i on Corrunittee of the J1.1etropolitan Cat hedral Recon-
s truction Boar d . 
Presi dent , Friends of the Leper s . (Thi s is composed of a gr oup of 
prominen t citizens and social workers who are help:L11g in t he physical 
~11d spiritual rehabilitation of the l epers, especially at the Tala 
Leprosarium.) 
The l eaf l et al so s tated tha t 11knowing that Communi sm is the enemy of the 
Church, he (Ledesma) has been active in anti-communistic moves by sup• ort-
ing AFP psy-war projects and similar projects. 11 
The Free Press reported that the Nacionalist Party 11 boasts of a leas t one 
. 4 
pillar of t he Catholic Church: Oscar Ledesma. 11 
The third maj or theme played up in the campai gn for Ledesma 1-ras the govern- 1 
ment positions and achievements he accomplished before he tossed his hat 
in the senatorial ring . 
Among the major positions he held Here: 
Secret ary of Commerce and Indu stry, 1954-57 
Chairman , Board of Directors, Nati onal I~rketting Corpor ation 
Phillippine Representative: \-Jes t Germany Industrial Fair, Hanover, 
Germany 
Member: Special Committee to s tudy proposal s f or the Revision of 'l'ra.de 
Agreement ,,;ri t h the United States. 
Chairman: Board of Directors, Philippine Sugar Insti t ute - f or 
Former Hayor of Iloilo. 
4 - Free Pr ess - Sept. 7, 1957 
----
l !; . 
P~ong his major accomplish~ents as a member of the Magsaysay Cabinet were : 
- played an active role in the filipination of retail trade; with the 
pas sage of t wo la1-rs. R.A. 1180 and 1292, about 11, 000 Filipino retail-
ers givep technical help in marketing tec~~iques, merchandising, pro-
curement .. and received loans from the Philippine National Bank. 
-promoted .foreign trade to increase ex-ports and thus strergthen dollar 
reserves. 
-insisted on policy of free enterprise and advocated reduction of govern-
ment participation in private business. 
-helped rehabilitate the sugar industry as president of National Federa-
tion of Sugarcane Planters in 1949. 
-promoted credit unions to give business men and farmers better credit 
faci lities. 
- as chairman of the Areonotics board expedited air transportation opened 
many new airports in provinces. 
-continued promotion of cottage industry as a means of improving welfare 
of rural areas . 
-encouraged incentives for producers realizing that increased production 
is the key to economic survival. 
These three were the main themes carried by the general literature dis-
tributed to the general public . However, special appeals 1v-ere put up f .or 
special publics. 
There were t he sugar blocks, the Namarco, the teacher s, and to t he alumni 
of the Ateneo de Manila (college) where the candidate finished his A. B. 
degree in 1921. 
I 
I 
I' 
I 
Table 2 shows the relative emphasis given these themes. 
LITERATURE: 
Themes played up and emphasis given them: 
THEi\'iES % of TOTAL 
Testimony of late President Magsaysay for candidate - 38.7 
more~ integrity (identifying of President & adding prestige) 
Candidate's being a Catholic Leader and his Catholic Record 
Fonner government achievements end positions 
Hill fight for cause of Sugarcane Planters (special appeal 
to Sugar Bloc) 
Will sponsor raising of teacher's salaries 
27.3 
21.0 
5.6 
3.2 
viill support and will work for expansion and success of Nrunarco 3.0 
(special appeal to Namarco distributors and retailers) 
lvill uphold Atenco ideals 1. 2 
TOTAL 100.0 
l C:, I 
- ~ • I 
---
1 
Evident from the table, the testlmony of Fresident Magsaysay is given the 
greatest pl ay-up in the campaign literature. It accounted for 38.7% of 
the total. The candidate' s Catholic achievements came second with 27.3%, 
manifesti ng the perceptible trend in Philippine politics of the i mportance 
of the Catholic vote. His government achievements came thi rd with a 
percenta ge of 21.0. 
Every brochure , leafl et , poster, sticker carried Magsaysay's statement of 
t he candidate: 11 Secretary Ledesma is one of the most honest, sincere and 
dedicated public officials I have kno1-m. 11 I!Ji th this sta tement often went 
along a picture of the candida te -v,ri th the late president. The most oft en 
that whic . shm.red i"1agsaysay jubilant over the electi on 
II 
=-~ 16. 
returns in ' 52, raised Ledesma's hand with his . 
Every candidate in the r ecent election knew that to i dentify himself' with 
the l ate presi dent ;.:rould win him the confiden ce of the electorate. AIA 
dug from the cabine t files a statement made by the Pres i d ent of its candi-
date and harped on this sta temen t on a Lmo s t every piece of campaign 
literature. 
The next heavily played-up theme was Lede sma ' s Ca tholic e.ctivi ties , 
garnering 27. Jfo of t he total. This Has focused upon getting the Ca t holic 
SUDDort and vote ; Special leaflets listing do;.m his Catholic record Here 
sent to various Cathol ic l eaders in the country . The picture coiD~only 
uublj shed with t his l eafl et 1-ras the picture of the candida te during his 
audi ence ¥ri t h the Pope . 
The thir major theme stres sed ua s the candi date ' s f anner government 
po sition s and achievements Hhich gathered 21.0% . There were snecial 
leafl ets tha t listed al l t hese in detail. Thes e former positions and 
a chievements were also jott ed dmm in capsule, in some ins tances, to be 
included in t he general l i tere.t ure which a.iriled to include a little of 
everything in the candi date ' s l iterature. 
Aside from brochures, leaflets, s t icker s, posters and billboard signs, 
t here ¥iere o t her gimmicks u sed . There was t he wallet and wall cal endars 
which carrie d Ledesma ' s picture and a brief description of hbn, and the 
appeal to vote for llim on el ection day . There were t he notebooks, pens; 
lJenci ls, banners, shirts , cigarette lighters , matches tha t carried t he 
candidate ' s name or pictur e, or both. 
- ---- -· 
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1 This vas the literature made for the general public . For t he special 
public , letters were 1f.Titten in the candidate ' s s t ationer-y a..11.d signed by 
I I' the candidate , were mailed out t o t hem . There was a specific , distinct 
appeal to each of t hese pe.rticular :publics . 
The targets of these l etters were: the sugar bl oc, the Natione~ lVlarketing 
Corpore.tion, the teachers in the country, and to fellow Ateneo Ahunni. 
The sugar bloc is a huge organization and can be a powerful tide in the 
elections i f its support is won over by a dandidate . Ledesma has been 
cl osely associ ated with the bloc. In 1949, when he retired from politics, 
he hel ped rehabilitate the indus tr"'J as president of the National Federation I 
of Sugarcane Planters . He held on to the position until 1953 when 
President Nagsaysay drafted him back t o the goverP..ment a s Secret e.ry of 
Commerce a.nd Industry. 
Up to the day he fil ed candi dacy for the Senate Ledesma was still connect-
ed vith the Sugar Ins t itute as chairman of the Board of Directors. 
I n his special appeal t o the sugar bloc, he promi ses to fight for t heir 
c~use and to strongly represent them in the Senate, if elected. 
Other than the three main appec-1ls, this ap1Jeal was str ongest in the 
ca1llpaign literature. 
In his l etter to the leaders and peopl e of the Sugar bloc, he said: 
n;vlany ti:.-nes in the recent past, we al l felt the need for stronger represen-
t ation in the Senate to fight for the rights of planters. The opportu_nity I 
has presented itsel f for me to seek a berth in the Senate under the 
Nacionalista ba..1111er. 
Since 1929, nearly a~l my ti:ne has been devoted to f i ghting for the 
- ~---- :;::- -=-~ II 
planters, because as you know, I myself belong to tl:rls group . Perha:;:Js, I 
need not refresh your mei'llory about our activities in the Na t i onal Federation 
of Sugarcane Planters, in the Sugar Producers Harketing Associa tion, and in 
the Philippi ne Sugar Institute ••• 
In our continuing fight for a common cause, therefore, may I solicit your 
a s s i stance a_n_d active support in t he com:i.ng elections? I shall :nake no 
promise ex cept that I shall pl ace myself a t your service a t all times and 
wo rk for the sugarcane Lndustr-y Hi thin the frarne>-rork of n a tional interest." 
.Another lett.er aimed at the -oublic and teachers in the countr-.:r went as 
follOI-TS: 
"Dear Tea cher:" 
II 
"AlJ.o>-r me to address you j.ust as your pupil vould address you-- dear teacher, 
because this means so much; it means love , honor and respect. For t his is 
exactly hm-r I feel about our public school teachers who a re doi ng such a 
tra~endous job for our people and getting so little recognition and 
a~preciation. 
Fortunr.~ tely, u..11der the l ate President Hagsaysay ' s aoininistre.tion and more 
recently under President Garcia, the tea chers have been getting a nev deal. 
}:,_s you very well knm-r, it 1-ras under the Nacionalista administration that 
the standa rd of teacher's salaries 1-,rere raised. 
Despite recent benefits, I sincerely believe tha t much more can be done f or 
the Helfare of public school teachers, I have heen a member of the Nagsaysay 
ce.binet for al most four y ears E'nd it 1-,ras then I realized that in order to 
build a strong ci tizanry, •re must have good, Hel l-train ed , decently paid 
teg,chers . 
\Ji th th:is a s a ba sis, I P.lll a:'. :)ealing for your SUl)·oor-r. 1n my candidacy for 
the semtte . If elected, you can be sure I shall always be at your service.' 
Ledesma was also identifie d i-Tith the National Marketing Corporati on and a 
special appeal Has d i rected a t NAJviARCO distributors and retailers: 
11 Dear NAl,1ARCO Distributor or Retailer : 
The fast development and expansion of the N.fuVIARCO are of paramount import- I 
ance to you. The bigger the NAl'ilARCO becomes , the more pro SJ)erous y our J1 
business, and the closer we shal l be to our goal of nationalizi n g the 
retail trade of the countr-J. Since you are aware, I believe, of my a ctive 
participation in the creation of the N.AHARCO, in the formul a t ion of its I 
policies and their subsequent i.~plementation, I feel that I can s peak and 
aypeal to you as a fello-vr helper in your noble endeavor to 'trres t the control 
of the retail trade from the hands of the aliens. 
H:w i ng been the Chairma_n of the Board of Directors of 
crea tion m1til the day that I filed my cer tifica te of 
I 
the NP...iVIARCO ,since its II 
candida cy for Senator 
l~ I '-I 
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I a111 fami liar with the 'Honderful work done by this Cor~oration towards 
enabling you and count less other Filipinos to enter the field of the retail 
trade >·ri th enough facilities to overcome the advantages formerly en,joy ed 
by your alien competitors. For the same reason, I also realize tha t 
NANARC0 1 s hel p so far has only given you a foothold, f ar from secur e, in 
I' I the retail trade of the coun try. To fully accomplish our obj ective of 
giving you control of the retail trade , N.ACMARCO' s business and fe.cili ties jl 
must be stren gthened and e:x:panded in the shortes t pos sible time. This ex- II 
pa.nsi on ca.n be undertaken onl y vri th additional l egislation. 
I 
Let me point out as an example one tremendous handicap under 1-rhich the I' 
NAHAJi.CO is now opera ting. 11~ though the capital fund of the NAMARCO is fixed I 
by l m-r a t P30,000,000 only t>m-thirds of that a."!lount, or P20,000,000 have 
1 
been released so far by the Na tional Treasury. This expl ains ·Hhy sometimes j 
the cas h osition of the NAivlA-'R.CO becomes so tight that it can not grant 
credit nor can it purchase goods in ever increasing volw11es in order to meet ' 
y our demands for bigger and bigger alloca tions. This handicap can be re-
moved by legis lation. 
On t he other hand, t he enemies of the NAKI\RCO-your enemies, therefore-are 
not asleep . SeverE>.l attempts have been made in t he pas t to kill the 
NAL'-1ARCO or to rend.er it usele s s, through l egi sl a tion and other means. You 
may be sure tha t more sustained a tten1pts vrill be made in the future. Let 
me just r emind y ou that in the las t sessj_on of t he Con gres s , an amendment 
to the NAMJl..RCO Law was passed in the Senate removing the ex emption of the 
NANARCO on 20% of its to tal importation of non-es s en tia~ i terns. You can ' 
well jJnagine the f atal eff ects- of such an amencL"!lent t o the NAJ:-'LARCO retailer t I 
Th/."t amendment 1-rould have s ililpl y 1-riped you out, s ince it i s only the t ax 
exemption vhich ena.bles the NAi"iARCO to suppl y you \d_th merchant able goods a t , 
price s low enough so tha t you may successfully meet t he challenge of you r 
better financed and bett er or ganized f oreign competitors . Fortuna tely , 
your fri ends Here also al-iake and they were able to kill the 8.111endment in 
the House of Representa tives . You can be pretty sure, however, that the 
attemp t shall be made time and again. It i s imperative, t herefo r e, that 
you should have more defenders in the Congress who ca.n 1-rard off the impden- I' 
ing blows . II 
l•iy record in the NAI>fARCO i s an open book . You know better than anybody hm-r ! 
deey is my i nteres t, how c:JJiding is my concern , for the conti.nued success 
and expansion of the NAHARCO. You may believe me, t herefore, vrhen I pledge 
to you that , if elected t o the Sena te, t hrough your hel p and support, your 
interes t and the interest of t he N.A.:Yi.AF.CO shall be foremo s t in my hear t . 
Hel p me novr and you c&.n be sure I shall kno1-r ho to reciproca te. 
Sincerely y ours , 
OSCAR LEDES:M.A 11 
II 
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Still another special anneal was ai.rned at another group, Hhich although a 
sma~ler group than the others , can be regarded almost as power+'ul. The 
last special aD-'Jeal Has directed a t fellow Ateneo a lum:.<1i. 
Various top po sitions in the govern.I1 ent and busines s a re held by .Ateneens. 
l·lhen Nagsaysay assumed pres i dency in 53 he filled his ce,binet and other 
importe.nt govern_,_"'ilent seats 1-d th Ateneans that led many to collh'llent that the 
govern...ment was being run by Ateneans. 
The l e tter to fellow Ateneo almn.ni containe d a promise to uphold 11 the best 
idea~s you and Ateneo stand for". 
11 Dear Fellm-r Atenean: 
As candidate for the Sena te in the Nacionalista party, I am. a::_:J)ea lin,s for 
your vote and your support. 
I ~moF t h s.t as an Atenean yo 1 would like to put men :in the government who 
represent the best ideals you and Ateneo stand for. 
I am enclos ing my record as a public servant and as a Catholic . And if you 
think I am worthy of your vote and support, please reinember me on ele ction 
day. I shall kno¥r how to reciproca te. 11 
Aside f rom this literature containing special a~)peals, the general litera-
ture was di s tributed to the masses during campaigns, rallies, and in 
Pers on a li t- sketches of the Lede&'!la a p5_:1 ea red in V8.rious magazines, like 
Philippines Interna tional, a monthl y trade magazine . These personality 
I 
ll 
I 
I 
I 
II 
i! 
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sketches diO.n 1 t have any by-lines and vas made to aDT' ea r ::ts if' they ;,rere 
II 
staff-
l 
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written, a c t ually, they were pieces turned out by the .AIA. 
The ma t erial was vrritten in such a toned doi-m man_11er (the Hay the candi date 
wanted i t to be ) that it vould be hard for the o r dinary r eader's eye to 
notice the propaganda material behind the bla ck and vhite print befo re his 
eyes. An exampl e: t alc en from the personalit y sketch which the Phili~ pines 
International carrie d: HA quiet man, success · seemes to have followed hi.'Tl 
a l l through the varied po s itions he has occupied i-Ii th honor. .A deepl y re-
ligious man , he has given t he lie to many who would scoff at the statement 
that a man ' s convicti ons have nothing to do i-d th his act i ons. .A family 
man, he has so ordered his busy business life tha t his nine chil dren may 
get a good share of 11 papa 1 s 11 time. • • a silent >vorker, but a determined one, 1 
Ledesma has s e t for himself and for all public officials high standar ds of 
efficiency, honesty, and integrity for those at t he rei ns of government ••• 
despite his busy s chedule , there i s a h ray s sufficient time t o listen to a 
man' s needs, to l end a hel ping hand, to sympathize 1-rith him . 11 5 
NEWSPAPERS 
The AIA hired a correspondent t o tag along 1-ri th Ledes..rna in his province-to- , 
p rovince, bario-to-bario crunpaigns. Duri n g the entir e campaign the co r res-
1 
pondent "Hi red his stories to the l"'anil a headquarters, who in turn, re1-rrote 
t hese s tor ies in news s tory form for immediate release to al l the Hanil a 
6 
dailies. 
The n ews storie s were mainl y a su~narization in news sto~y form of the 
speeches given by the candid a te a t rallies, repor t of crovrd attendance 
5Philippines International , Sept. 1957, p.5 
= 
6All six top n e1-rspapcrs in the Philip;Jines are publi shed in Nanila. 
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The Dai ly Bulletin , The Daily l'1i rror, and the Evening Ne··rs.) 
(es~ecially 1•hen a big crowd), report of candidate' s alleged strength in 
the diff erent par ts of t he countl"J. 
22 . 1 
Aside from the stor ies tha t the i_vlanila off ice got from the correspondent, 
the office also issued plain neHs releases to the six main newspapers. 
These relea ses contained a report of the candida te ' s strength ·n diff erent 
narts of the cou.11tr.r, advance s torie s on !Jlc:mned CEunpaign tri:Js, r allies, 
and r adio interviews, and repor t of var i ous organizations pledging their 
sup:oort of the candidate. Though not as often, nei-rs releases Here also 
sent to the Bagong Buhay, a ne1-rspa.per printed in the national language and 
to the various small nm-rspapers in the Southern region of the coun t ry-
·rhere the candidate is especially strong. In one issue of Yuhum, southern 
_aper ~~itten in Visayan dialect , a Ledesma story was given front page 
ifri te-up , was the banner stoJ7 f or the i ssue together Hi t h a picture of 
Ledesma handshaking his way in a market in Sorsogon. 
A great advantage that t he AIA had ••as the fact that i ts director ~ras the 
fo1~er editor of the Philippines Herald and t hat all its foremost workers 
were former reporters. Thus, it had close contact and enjoyed the can1aderie 1 
of many ne1-rspapermen . They knew the persons to alproach that their re-
leases may see print . 
News releases which were made daily were brought personally to the editors 
or to the men they 1 1G~ew 1 that same afternoon . This obviously has a mar ked 
advantage over mailed releases . 
Aside from the correspondent, the AIA also hired a photographer to tag 
along in Ledesma 1 s ca."ilpaigns. His job Has to take action pictures of 
~-
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Lede sma while speaking before big political rallies, h c:mdshaking campai gns, 
etc •. The photogr apher t hen s ent all the pictures to the Hanila head-
LlUarters 1-rhere t hey Here sorted, edited, captioned and :i.Jllillediately releas ed 
to all the newspapers and magazine s. 
The ne1-rs photo releases 1-rere ma inly pi ctur es of the c andida te warmly 
mi..Tlgling with the "common man" in C8Jnpaigns, lJi ctures of crowds att ending 
I 
1 r allies , :pi c t ures dug up show:LTlg candidate ui th the late President l"lagsay say , 
and pictures of political rallies in >fh ich the candidate participated. I. 
II 
But the main t h eme of the ne-us photo releases wa s the candidate's "close 
l 
1 association " with the common me.n , identifying him with the masses. 
I 
I 
j, 
NE\.JSPAPER ADS: 
Pieces of literature were u s ed for paid ads. Like for example, lett ers 
addressed to the teachers, or the letter addressed to the sugar planters, 
e t c •• 
Various newspaper spaces were bought ranging from a filler to a full-pa ge I 
ad. The filler would si!nply conte.in "Vote Ledesma for Senator". The full !1 
page ad would consist of the candida te's picture, President Mags aysay testimon-
1 
is~, and an elli!umera tion of his top achievements. 
But as shov..'11 by table 1 
--==--' 
there was more stress pl a ced on ne1-rs relea ses 
and getting into the paper ' s nevTS cohmms rather than in its advertisi ng 
colu.'11Ils. One can easily perceive the reasoning behind this. While a 
news release may be disguised as a straight neus item, advertising may be 
disregarded by the readers as 11 just one of those political ads . 11 And durin~· 
I the peak of campaigns and as election day drew closer, every party , every 
candidate added fu~y to his campaigning, increased pressure on voters to 
vote for him tha.t the voter tenced to be bored or confused that he was 
more likely to disregard the ads he saw. 
RADIO 
This communication medium was mainly used for spot am1ouncements; the 
')_( _. 
attempt is to give the name of the candidate over and over agali1 in the 
manner of the familiar drone of a typical aspirin tablet or cigarette 
commercial. A typical spot a.n..YJ.ouncelJl.ent would go like this: 11Vote Ledesma 
for Senator. President Magsaysay had this to say about Ledesma: 'Ledesma 
is one of the most honest, sincere public officials I have known. Vote 
Ledesma for Senator. or simply: Vote Ledesma, vote Ledesma, Vote Oscar 
Ledesma for SenatOr on Nov. 8. 1 ." 
Other th~YJ. the spot announcements, the AlA didn't buy radio time for the 
candidate to deliver his speeches. Instead, the firm made it a point to 
arrange radio int ervie¥rs as often as possible. 
T~-ro of the l eading newspapers in Hanila (The li.ianila Times and The Manila 
Chronicle) ow~ radio stations. Both statiomstage an interview of govern-
ment officials once a week. During election year, the Chronicle Broad-
casting Corporation holds a nightly int erview of this type called the 
11News and Views 11 program. During this nightly program, representatives 
of major political parties are invited to air and clarify their respective 
rograms of governments. 
The AlA tried to get the station to interview itl candidate ,a,s often as it 
could. Adv~YJ.ce stories of the intervi-ew would be sent to the dailies. 
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After the interview, news s tories on what happened and '"hat was said by 
the candidate during the interview are written out and sent to the 
papers. 
SPEECHES: 
Speeches analysed didn ' t contain any 'name-calling' or l ambasting of 
opponents personality. They were all constructive criticisms, if the 
ca.n.didate did criticize his opponents. Cri ticis..ms were grounded and 
defended 1d th facts. This was the main job of AIA with regard to the 
hii'Ilself, who most of the time during his ca1npaigns, delivered his 
speeches extem.pora..neously. 
One of themin themes harped upon in his speeches wa r:: the defense of 
the present administr."?..tion' s (Nacionalista) economic program. His 
speeches strived to sho~or the voters tha t the standard of living is higher 1 
than it vras when the Liberal party was in pmrer. Here , he would cite 
prices of prime com..'TI.odities now and their prices dur.ing the Liberal 
adminis tra ti on. 
I 
I The speech the candidate delivered on Magsaysay' s death was also ,fidely 
I 
I' published. 
Other themes played up were his achievements in gover.nn1ent positions, 
which he held before he joined the senatorial array . There is his 
Ca tholic leadership, his i dentity with the sugar bloc, his concern over 
II 
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Namarco, and his Ateneo ideals. 
TV 
The AIA made no attempt in using this medium during its ce.mpaigns for 
Ledes~a for the reasons stated on Page _9 ___ • 
THEATERS 
Prior to the main film being shmm in the theater Ledesma ads were shown 
on the screen for about one minute. 
RECAPITULATION 
The analysis of the themes played up during the ca~paigns showed that 
the over-all public relations Hark done by AIA consisted of a mor e con-
structive and general personality build-up rather than mere mudsli nging 
which was widely practiced, by other opponents. 
The campaign literature contained a general toned-down theme with simply 
an ennumeration of the candidate ' s achievements. The appeal f or the 
II 
II 
votes of the people Here not pressurized. In his speeches, the candidate 
did not lambast the personalities and characters of his opponents nor did ~ 
he hurl charges of corruption, graft and other popular criticisms against ! 
the opposing parties. I 
The campaign of Ledesma was so well organized that a fei-l days before 
election day, fieldmen fanned out to the provinces to distribute campaign 
materials, especially sample ballots and to make secret negotiations 
with local political leaders. 
In pl aces, where opposition candidates were strong, Ledesma's name was 
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~ inserted in sample ballots of Yulo or Hanahan (the presidential ~andidates-~---=---
of the other t1m p rtie s, the Liberal and Progressive). 
A.11.d '..ri thout the knoHledge of Ledesma 1.rho insisted thB t his campaign f or the 1 
senate kept on the level and steer a>-ray fron1 the mir e of pol i tics , the 
AIA pr a ctised a great deal of 11 horse- trading11 • j 
The AIA see.mingly held the ,,-j_dely-spr ead feeling tha t due to a great nu.rnber I 
of candidates for the senate, the only way for a candidate to get elected 
is to make ex tra party deals. 
A Nacionalista candidate would say to a Liberal ce..ndida te: "You ca.r1--;-y me on 
your ticket and I will you on mine . 11 It is dog eats dog. Candidates f eel 
7 
no s ense of loyalty to their colleagues in the party. 
So, the fiel~men would fan the places where their opposing partie s have a. 
strorg hold. Then they would mal.ce s ecret negotiations ·Hi th the leaders 
th8.t t hey (AIA fieldmen) would support their candidate in exchange for their 
su_port for Ledesma. 
Furthermore, Ledesma was one of t he five (mixed) senato1~al candida tes 
endorsed by the Catholic hierarchy-. This '1-TA. S evident l·rhen sample ballots 
with only five Ca tholic candidates were distributed all over the country. 
A novel strate~J was employed by AIA in the f i eld of Philippine political 
cam.pai ning. During the campaigns , AIA fieldmen made use of t heir so-callecil 
11 Hhi s:pering carnpaign 11 • (obta:L."'led from inter view Hith AIA director) This 
particula r ca'TI.paign consisted in planting men. AIA men would incogni t o 
7Free Press, 11 The Voice of the People" , Nov. 9, 1957. 
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mingle with people in the farms, in the fields, or in the favorite corner 
stores, barbershops, and in other places where people usually assemble and 
exchange ideas. They would join the conversation as an ordinary man would 
and after striking a general conversation would slowly shift the conversation 
into politics. Once the conversati on has shifted into politics, the AIA 
man ~-rould inject i deas into the conversation and present facts to back them 
up. Then , as the discussion gets deeper, he is soon able to lead them into 
t al king about the senatorial candidates and this is the time 1-rhen he plugs 11 
for Ledesma. This obviously was very eff ective as the people with whom 
the se men had mingl ed, had no idea at all that they had actually undergone 
a mild "brainwashing." 
Post-election figures showed that Ledesma finished fifth, garnering 
1,670,774 votes out of a grand total of 5,113,858 voters who actually went 
to the polls and voted. 
SUfifr,Lli.RY - NATIONAL ELRCTIONS 
Precincts 
Provi nces : 28 , 635 
Cities: 4,663 
Grand To tal : 33,298 
Province 
Citie s : 
Grand Total: 
Ha~e 
3,289,511 
581,669 
3,871,180 
Voters Actuallv 
Nale 
2,521, 231 
418,9.36 
2,940,167 
Number of 
Femal e 
2,,4.61 ,699 
432,028 
2,893,727 
Voted 
Femc.l e 
1 ,862,068 
311,623 
2,173, 691 
Courtesy of Philippine Commission on Elections. 
Regi stered Voters 
Tote_l 
5, 751,210 
1 ,013,697 
6, 764.,907 
Total 
4, 393,299 
730, 559 
5,113,858 
I 
II 
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were 54 candidates for Senator all in all. The eight candidates who 
<rere elected are as they finished the following: Gil J . Puyat, Arturo 
Tolentino, Eulogio Balao, Rogelio de La Rosa, Oscar Ledesma, Ambrosio 
Padilla, Roseller T. LLm, Cipriano P. Primicias. 
As the results started comL~g in, it was evident that Ledesma was as sured 
I 
of a berth in the Senate. Horrever, he and long-time movie idol Rogelio de la 
Losa fought tooth to tooth for the fourth place. The earlier tallies gave 
II Ledesma the edge over de la Rosa, who like Ledesma was tossing his hat in 
the senatorial ring (as well as in politics) for the first tnne. 
Later as more figu r es poured in, de la Rosa slorrly but steadily hopped over 
Ledesma to take over the fourth position. Although this is de la Rosa 's 
firs t attempt into politics, and whose candidacy was snickered at the the 
'intellectuals', nevertheless his impressive victorf could be acsounted for 
I' 
by his nation-wide popularity among the co~uon people who have devoutly been I 
I 
his ardent movie fans. He was probably the most well-known candidate to the · 
mass of people. Crowds who attended his rallies manifested a belief in his 
promises and confidence of his being a senator - and this was backed by the I 
election turnout. 
li 
I Ledesma <ras strongest in the southern regions of the country. He pl aced 1 
first in five provinces (Antique, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, 
Romblon) and three cities (Bacolod, Iloilo City, and Silay). 
I' 
Negros Oriental, 
This could be 
accounted partly for egionism. Ledesma hails from the Southern part of the 
country. He was born in Silay City, Negros Occidental, and during the 
' Quezon administration served as me.yor of Iloilo. During the Japanese 
occu ation Ledesma was USAFFE Assistant Civil Affairs Office in :anay 
later acting governor of Iloilo province and mayor of Iloilo City. 
Election figures show that he fared badly in some parts of the North and 
Central regions of the country. Ledesma tailed the other seven winning 
candidates in Cagayan, Ilocos Norte, La Union, Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, 
Tarlac provLDces and wound up last in two cities in the Central secti on 
Cabanatua..D and Dagupan. (See appendix: election figures) 
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l CHAPTER IV PR HORK BEHIND THE 1950 U.S. SENATORI.AL RACE 
One of the most striking exruaples of how a political public relations man 
could turn the tide against a sure winner, but remai...J. in the background, 
was that of the Maryland senatorial race in 1950. 
Millard T<Jdings led the Sena te Foreign Relations subcommittee Hhich had 
investigated McCarthy's charges of communist infiltration into goveTIL~ent. 
He was the fir s t major conservative leader to denounce l'1cCarthy, having 
declared the allegations to be unfounded and harmful to imwcent people. 
He had a long trail of political achievements and success as a vote-getter. l 
T:rdings was a Democrat in a state where 70% of the registered voters belong~ 
ed to his party. There were only three countie s - Allegany, Charles and 
Garret - that have traditionally showna predominantly Republican registra-
tion. Nevertheless , the sta te had had no Republican gove2··rwr since 1934 
and no Republican senator since 1928. I n many places, a Republi can organ-
izati on as an active group, simply did not exist. ~fuere it did, its 
leaders were often all too ready to make deals "i-d.th the majority Demo crats.
1
1 
All facts and figures in this chapter are derived from Stanley Kelley, Jr.'s 
I 
Professional Public Relations and Political Power - Chapt. IV pp . 107- 14 3. I· 
Yet the results of the Tydings-Butler campaign sprung a surpri se to all 
experienced political observers . 'Tydings was defea t ed. 
Butler •.-las an unfamili ar na.lD.e t o the vot ers. Neither did he possess any 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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cha rismatic characteristics that could account for his sounding victory 
over a \-Tell-established poli Mea~ figure. His victor-y can best be under-
s tood by looking h:tto the operations of Jon N. Jonkel, the Chicago public 
relations man 1-rho managed his caTUpaign . 
On l'1ay 15, 1950, John H. Butler announced to a small audience in a 
Baltimore h otel that he i-rould seek the Republican nomination f or T-y-ding ' s 
sena te po s ition. His early campaign eff orts did not attract any great 
att ention. Following the suggestion of Ru t h McCormick Hiller, editor of 
t he Hashi ng ton Ti1nes-Herald and Bertha Adkins, Republican National Committee-
! 
1-roman from rhryland, Butler turned to Jonkel for help. Jonkel accepted 
the position of the candidate ' s campaign as sistant at a salary of $1, 50 . 
a month. 
Jonkel's f irst move Has to conduct an informal opinion survey. He pl aced 
h:L.tJ.sel f outside the theaters in dmmtmm Baltimore and asked patron s 
i?hether they felt tha t Senator Tydings had done a good job as a Senate 
i nvestigator or h...ad covered up Connnunists in the Sta te Department . He 
a sked t he sa'lle o_ues tions of ca b drivers and poli ce desk-sergeants - l ate 
a t ni ~ht 1-rhen t hey had time to talk free l y . He int erviei,ed professional 
politicians, bu.siness..rnen, and people "in t he know." 
His opinion s1rvey revealed tha t: almost 70% of t he people in the survey 
did not know whe t her t he 'r>Jdi n gs inves tigation had been f airly conducted 
or not; and few people had heard of John M. Butler. 
The unfmnil iarity of voters to t he name Butler posed a serious problem and 
proximate danger to Jonkel when General D. John Harkey also threw hi s hat 
33. 
in the Reut blican s en a t oriB_l ring . Harkey, Aide to Gene r a l Pershing i n 
t he First \·lorld liar and a. member of the national executi ve conrrnittee of 
he American. Legion, had been the Republicen candidate a gains t SenB.tor 
Herbert R. 0 1 Com1or i n 1946. He had come 1D_thin 2,000 votes of unseat i n g 
the incurn.bent Demo crat. Harkey pron1ised t o 11 reveal here tofore unknm,n 
fe_cts abou t the communistic i n fluence in t he State Department, 1-ii th re-
spect to Korea, where hundreds of American sol diers are dying dai l y to 
hel p correct t he errors and mistaken policies of our Democrat · c Admi s -
rl-
strat ion. 11 0 
The Markey announcemen t meant a renewal and stren gt hening of eff or t s t o 
the Butle r quart ers. Jonkel opened campai gn headquarters wlth one ful l-
ti..lTle vol unteer ;rorker, Mrs . Ca therine Van Dyke and t wo part-time Harkers. 
H" s s t r£.t e c n i s ted of pu blicizing Butl er ' s na'ne Hi th t he -ourpose of 
creating an i l l usi on of victory for his candidate, <;md concentrating on 
;.Tinning a ma jority unit vote . The na ture of this strateg<J Has that of 
convincing Rep blican party ;.rorke r s tha t t hey could put Butler over i n 
the gen er e_l e l ections . 
An advertising s chedul e vas s et up. One-inch, one-column reverse pl ate 
"Be for Butler11 ads 1rere ul a.c ed a t least once on each pa,ge of r·'faryl ::-11d 
Heeklies. Sneeches and an itinerary Here p r epar eCJ. by Jonkel ' s of f ice for 
Candidate Butler, and S1.l.Inmaries of t hese spee ches 1.rere a]Jproprie_t el y 
rel ee_sed t o the papers . 
Speci al attention was gi ven to the opinion leaders . A mailing list of 
§rou9 l e&ders 1-iEJ.S com iled, including t he names of businessmen, fraternal 
Kel l ev OP. CIT. , -'=l .llL. 
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lectders, clergymen, l abor leaders, and othe rs who wer e in a position 
place t heir opinions before s i zea.ble groups of peopl e. To these particvlar 
peopl e, Jonkel sent mai l direct. 
Around 200 ,000 enny postel cards were mail ed to registered Republicans 
asking their support for Butler. Radio pieces, phamplets, f orm letters, 
and personal letters went o t, all de signed a s 11 a.dvance pieces" on the 
general el ection campai gn agains t Tydings . 
vlhen a t hird candide.te for the Republi can nomi nation 1·lithdrm-r, the nomina-
t ional f i ght became primarily a Markey-Butler clB.sh. The t Fo triggered 
their attacks a t Tydings and at the Democratic administration and not at 
each ot her. This was done by arr an gement but Butler »'8.S the more active 
of the two. The domi nant no te tha t t he two harped ·upon was the whi te-;.;ash 
charge . 
Butler a sked that 11 ••• if there has been a wilful attempt to cover up 
disloyalty and errors in the fonnulation of our f oreign policy, l et us 
s ee evidence of a frank and honest enalysis of the char ges that have 
sun_lc deep into the memory of every voter Hho fear s any kind of corruption 
in our govern..'1lent. 11 
Markey said that his campaign vas a "crusade to eradica te from publi c 
office all persons, el ected or appointed, 1-rho have been responsible for 
the sell-out to Stalin in .Asia. 11 
During the las t lfreek of the campaign, Jonkel sent a special delivery 
l ett er to all members of the county central committees t hroughout 
'I 
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Mery l n d in 1-rhich he tried to create the impres s ion tha.t a Butler nrL'Tlar.r 
victor r was sure . He sovght E.dvice on budgetting and speaking I' rrangemen ts 
for t he c ming figh t against Tydi n gs. La ter , he admitted., 11 I 1-ras not 
con f i dent, but it Has sure r n e to make it l ook that \·ray . JUl the f el l oHs 
in the counties Here s itting and Fe.i t ing to s ee w!1i ch side they s hould go 
, with, and we convinced enough of thsn, I believe, that they h ·d better 
s tay 1-ri th u s . n 
Jonkel also studied Markey 1 s movements and directed Butler i nto those 
countie s rhere :Harkey was spending l ittle time. 
He :ryland Re~Jublicans gave John :Harshall Butle r 32,899 popul ar votes and 
82 unit votes. To Genera l D. John Mark ey, they gave 31,. ,791 ;_Jopular vot es 
but onl .r 70 unit votes. 9 Butler had Fan his chance to take a cre.ck at 
D~~ocrat Tydi ngs. 
THE GENERAL ELECTION C.Ai'IP AIGN 
Tyd.i..11 s appointed Hilton A. Reckard, Haryl cmd 1 s Adjutent-Cren.eral, end 
F. Hurrc:.y Benson, his lm-1 iJ8.rtner, as his ca"'ima-!.gn managers c;nd Thomas 
J. Ken·ney , past president of the Hol y N&IDe Socie t y of t he Archdiocese of 
Bal timor e, as his treasurer. He handed the resuonsibility of supervising 
and p ~eparing publicit;y materials to Jos eph Katz Emd Company, a Baltimore 
advertising a g·ency tri th a national reputation. 
Butl e r campaigners phrased s pecial appea~s for Negro c-..nd Ca tholic votes. 
They hurled chc r ges that T-ydings had f orgot ten his constituents. They 
a ttemp ted to ident ify Tydings with the Administration a-11d to turn its 
U..TlT)OPulari t y against him. I n doing t h i s , they s truck at t hose points 
0 - -
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which Tyding ' s caznpa.igners emphasi zed - t.he important ~Josi tions 1f _ich the 
Senator occupied on Senate committees. 'I'hey tried to arouse l atent anti-
Tydi n gs sentiment amon g Democratic party -.rorkers . 
But , just as in the primary elections, the dominant theme of the Butler 
campaign as the 11 '1>rl-',i tewash11 charge. Jonkel pl ayed up the tharne in a 
different twist. 'I'ydings wa s cha rged not for h~ving been soft on 
Commtmi sts but tha t the re Has doubt as to whether or no t he had, as Jonk el 
put it: 11ue 1-rorked with the fa.ct t hat e. very , very big doubt existed in 
the minds of the peopl e of i'1arylcnd, a.nd in my original survey >re found 
many doubts ••• All that we had to prove Has that the people di d not knov -
and they did not know - and ve worked in that area ••• It vould have t aken •• • 1 
literally thousand s of pages of -v,'Ords of testimony to try to prove a point. l 
I said 1Let1 s not get i nto the business of proving whether or no t it 
10 
vhiteHash, l et ' s stay in the business that a doubt does exist.'" 
ras a 
j 
This vas the whole slant of Jonkel 1 s campaign. He did not want to tBl<e thej 
bu rden of proving a :90int. He just played up P..nd magnified a doubt . 
To Jonkel , the 6ommunist-in-goverruaent i s sue was especially importnnt 
because it off ered E'c l ever uhich might pry loose for the Republicans the 
normally Democratic voters of u rban Cathol ics. 
The Republican candidates f or s t a t e-viide office Theodore R .• NcKel din, the 
gubernato:-ictl candidate; Butl er; and V.Tilliam A. Gunther, the part r r s 
choi ce fo r a.ttorney-gene ral - often travelled togethe r. This combined 
1 
action iv s importent to Butler as ivlcKeldin was extremel y popul ar and 1-rell- ' 
knm-m . 
p . l 2l 
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However, in some al~eas of the state, i"IcKeldin made deliberate efforts to 
avoid becoming too closely identified id th Butler. Jonk:el had discovered 
ee.rlier in the campaign that 11 l~'fo st of the men in BB~ tJmore, end most of the I 
men throughout the State, practically everyone of the newspaper ••• did not 
want to be, as they said 'out against Tydings 11 • Very few peopl e in the 
II 
State, e speciclly peo~ le of s tature, Hanted to get out and campaign against 
Tydings. 11 11 II 
Even at the beginning of the joint campaign, Jonkel encountered considerable 
opposition from some elements of the Republican party . Press releases 
Here not joint efforts and radio and tel evision t:iJne were rarely shared . 
He counteracted these opp reitions by sending Butler ' s speeches and dictated , 
some of his state111ents to the press by phone. Jonlcel pointed out that in 
the speeches, they tried to say as many things tha t other people had s aid 
against the adminis tration and a gainst Senator Tydings a s pos sible. He 
continued: 
11 I:!e (Butler) talked about the situation in Korea, which was pretty hot at 
I 
the tL"'lle... he never said that Senator Tydings had hel d back anns from any " 
I 
pl a ce. You did not have to say that . All you had to s ay was that Senator 
Tydings had been chairman of the Senate Armed Services Cornmi ttee, and that 11 
so much money had been spent on the Armed Forces... II 
II 
II He campaigned a l so on the fact that Senator Tydings had been the chair- I. 
man of a subcommittee which investigated the loye.lty of the State Deoart.onen t 
- I 
employees. 
" Most of the time, he uould say, 'You are a Father, you are a mother, are 1 
you sati s fied? ' 
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11 Then he "Y: u l d say , fo r instance , tha t 1 ftus sia boas ts tha t all over t he 
world it is going to take ove r the world by f orce, by trickery, or by thi s 
or that . Thi s is ou r countr;)r . He have seen it happen in other countries. 
You c..re a father, you are a mothe r, do y ou believe tha t "l·re a r e well organ-
i zed here? Do you f eel that you know f or sure tha t there are no conE~unists 
or communist influence in the top l evels of ciur government? ' 
11You just a sked them t ho s c_uestions. Those a re t he qu estions he asked. 
This i s the 1-my he campaign ed. He n ever had any thing personal e.gains t 
Senator Tyd.in gs . 11 12 
Ne>ISP8.!)er a.dver tising 1-rent on . The s tress on r adio an d TV v.ras on spot 
,, 
I 
announcemen ts instead of speech broadcasts . The purpose of t hi s is to gain ,, 
n ame recogni t ion and in the Butler campai gn literatur e, the same themes 
were phr ased and rephra sed, i nterwoven and reiterated. In all sor ts of 
'I 
campaign materia~, voters of a~ost any cla s s could find, tailored and I 
ready made fo r them a reason to vo te against Tydings. I 
Jonkel directed 75,000 copi e s of a folder entitled "Ba ck to Good Old Dix ie? " 
at the Negro popula tion of l'1aryl and. In red and bla ck l e t t ers, the mes sage 
"1-le ' ve been Tyding 1 s political f ootball."' -.ras spelled out 1dth Tyding ' s 
voting r ecord on FEPC, on discrimination in the schools end fed eral housing 
proj ects, on poll t axes and anti-lynching bi ll s . The f older announced I' 
i tsel f e.s autho r ized by Bishop Alexander P. Shaw, Reverend J. Timothy Bodie, 
and John R. Berry, all prominent Negro Republi cans . It >-ras financed by 
Butler headquarter s. 
Another folder contained plates of anti-Tydings cartoons from newspapers 
throughout the country. This piece got its i dea from Tydi ng ' s mm. campai gn 
1 2 ====¥===K=e=l;:l;:e~y:d:::op . cit , pp . 1 2 3-L:. 
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literature, in vrhich had appeared the statement "Hillard Tydings i s knovm 
and respected from Maine to California. He has put Iviary l and on the 
political map . " Jonkel ' s ans1-rer vras "You sure did, Sena tor. 11 end car toons 
wi th the whi tevrash theme. 
Jonkel 1 s con sistent techni que throughout t he campaign wa s tha t of _uot ing 
from independent, or apparently independent sources as a ~-ray of resenting 
appeals. It was calculated to comba t the voters ' na tural skepticism to a 
ca!ldidate ' s claim on his own behalf to be "honest, eff icient, and lo~ al. " 
The words "apparentl y independent sources" are used. And it is used 1-Tith 
justifica tion a s J orucel of ten worked hard to plant s t a tements in newspapers
1 
so he could later quote them. 
A shee t, with the headline 11W"D_y , Senator Tydings ?", the size of a normal 
newspaper page an d printed in red, had originally appea red as an advertise- 1 
ment in the Washington Times-Herald . Soon there were 100,000 reprint s 
which pos ed these questions: 
111-JHY, di dn ' t you ask Secretary of State Dean Acheson to tes t ify about 
loyalty? 
"~lHY didn ' t you allo'i-r the minority members of t he Committee ••• the non-
Administration members ••• to bring •ritnesses into the investigation? 
I 
11 1-JHY i s there all the ta.lk abou t your ke eping parts of the hearinp, out of the 
official record? II 
"1-IHY did you take the work of Earl Brmrder about whethe r or not any of 
t hese men were communists ? Didn't you think that as former top Communist 
in this country that he 1.rould cover up f or a.nyone suspected of being a R~J?1 11 
13 
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Along -w'i. th this document 1-TaS a reprinted editorial from the Times-Heral d, 
"The Re~Jort Nobody Believes , 11 pi ctures of Senator 1\Jdings, Green, 11cHa.hon , 
and HcCe.rthy, and nti-Tydings cartoons. The editorial branded T-.rdi n g-s as 
a "Nevi Deal er, " noted t hat he was "the s on-in-lm• of Jo senh E. Davie , 
Roosevelt ' s Russophile a..rnbassador to Russia, 11 and observed: 
jl 
11 The Ameri ca.n people now ha ve a simple cri t e r i on f or detennining Communist 1 
inf l uence in t his country . It will be evidenced fully qy coru1t· ng u~ 
14 t ho se who support the Tydi n gs report." 
Another re rint from the Times-Herald accompF~..nied 1-r.L th lar ge pictures of 
Butle r po sed 1-ri th his fruilly in his home HaS released . nm hundred t hou s-
e.nd copies of t his r eprint read a s follows: 
"Johnny Butl e r sold apers to p eople hurrying pas t the corne r of North and 
Greenmount in Bal t imore, and didn ' t think he ' d ever be nomina ted for the 
United Sta.tes Senate • •• He 1 d lie awake a t night in South Bal t:Lmore where 
h e was born and hear his father tell his mother ho1 he could s ave money by 
giving un streetcar r i de s and walking to work . There were four chil dren 
to support •• 
"The day aft er war Has decl red, J ohn But l e r joined the anny • •• After the 
war he studi ed at nigh t and pas s ed his entrance exe . .ms fo r the Johns Hopk i ns 
Univers ity, where he blossomed into a sta r right tackel on the f ootball 
team ••• 
"John mar rie d Marie Loui s e Abel a 1-reek after gr aduation. He ' d met her 
years before, wh en he ha d a sunm1er job demon s trating Dodge autos •• He h~ rdly 
I 
noticed lv1arie Louise, but later a friend took her out and aske d John to go 
1~Kelley, op . cit . , p . l 26 
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along. From then on, they noticed each other a great deal ••• 
11Jobn 1 s l egal talent has raised his income to five figures, and his comfort-
able home reflects an air of good fellmlship and rel igious tolerance among 
his fa.mily . 
1::; 
He ' s a Iviethodist, and Hrs. Butler' s a Catholic. " _.. 
On the other side of the reprint appeared Butle r ' s cam.paign s~Jeeches and 
pictures of Tydings, Butler, a farmer, and a barber. The picture of the 
farm er was cap tioned: "Senator Tydings had a chance to pr ove to all of us 
that there vrere not Communis ts in our government. He left doubt in my 
mind. I'm going to vote for John Marshall Butl er beca.use he will fi ght 
Comm·unism in Government." The barber is quo t ed as saying, "I'm going to 
vote for John Marshall Butle r for Senator because we need a change, After 
24. years in office, l'f.tr. T-ydings has forgotten that he represents the peopl e. 11 
I 
This _a rticular reprint exemplifies Joclcel 1 s attempt to overcome reader II 
resistence to political propaganda . A picture of a farmer milking the covr I 
is not ordinarily polemic, and one has read the cap tion almos t before he 
realizes that this particula r one is. 
Jonkel also prepared 100,000 copies of a twelve-page booklet, 11\IJhat ' s the 
Score? 11 It attacked the Administration ' s Korean War record and presented 
Tydings as an Aci'ninistration leader. Page nine uas a f ascimile of a circu-
l ar relea sed by the Bryn Hawr College Endo1-ment Committee in v!ashington, 
D.C., advertising 11 four off-the-record sessions on Russia ." Chai rmen and 
speakers of the session s lis ted were B.aymond S1rrn.g, radio commenta tor; Oven 
Lattimor e: Harrison Salisbu:ry, United Press Foreign Editor and fo reign 
Moscm-r correspondent; Iviiss Ka therine ·icBride, President of B:ryD NahT 
• College; Ja1nes Reston , New York Times corresuondent at the United Na t ions: 
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Sir Bernard Pares, former adviser on Russia to the British gove~~ent; 
Phillip F. Mosely, U. S. adviser at the Moscm-r conference; .Alger Hiss, of 
the Carnegie Endo 7Tilent for International Peace ; and F.ay Ellis , Vlar Produc-
tion Board representative in Russia and president of t he Raytheon Corpore.-
tioh. 
In the Butler bookle t, a red line circled the names- of Senc:-.tor and Hrs. 
Millard E. Tydings, listed among the 28 patrons and patronesses, and wuund 
itself around 110FF-THE-RECORD11 , 1101-ren Lattimore," and 11 Alger Hiss" as it 
continued do~m the page. 
In all these booklets and phamplets, t he colors, black and red seems to 
have been Jonkel 1 s favorite combination . 
Jonkel kept his eyes open for ~rays to crys t allize resentment he knew to 
exis t among organization Democrats regarding Tyding ' s policies on the di s-
tribution of patronage. He found his solution in doing a card "Make Herb 
' 0 1 Com1or Senator, 11 printed on both sides so tha t no matter on what side it 
fell, it ;.rould still be read. Democratic Senator 0 1 Connor, lately Mary-
land ' s Governor, had been well known for his a t tention to patronage matters 
and the leaflet was left in places where Democrats were likely to convene . 
Here again, Jonkel has prO\Qded a reason for action, or ,inaction . 
Direct mail to opinion leaders was continued. Luck vras on Jonkel 1 s side 
in one case. He found a popula.r bakery supply man Hho 1-ras willing to 
sponsor a letter stating his approval of Senator Butler ' s candi dacy to all 
bakery men in the state. Jonkel hoped that Baltimore baker s 1-rould speak 
favo r ably of his candidate to an audience he particularly wanted to r each; 
~v~~ ====~========:: 
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up the bread of the old countries for the cellophane-wTapped product avail -
able a t t he supermarket . 
To reach a greater number of the same audience, Jonkel focused his a ttention 
to the Cath ol ic clergy . A letter to them r ead as follows: 
11 As the trusted guide of men and women, you are especially aware of t he 
forces attempting to di srupt the s piritual and secular integrity of the 
1\merican people. I believe you will agree 1·ri th me tha t Communism i s one 
of t he most persistent and carefully-shielded pressures He must withs t an d 
if we are to survive as individuals and as a na tion of many freedoms. 
11 I realize that the Church ce.nnot take an active part in politics but I 
want you personally to know where I stand. I believe in my count~J and in 
my God . And I wil l not permit anything to cor rupt the rigbteous inf l u en ce 
of either. 
11 I pledge th8.t if I am elected t o t he United Sta.tes Senate, I will do 
everything ~dthin my power to defend us a gains t t he athei stic Th1 s sia 
oversea s or from Communists and their friends within our Government . 11 (p . l 28 )' 
I 
A more genera l letter 11l'1y Dear FellaH Harylander11 : 
11 I wish the re were tL'lle for me to ·Hri te you a more p ersonal note aski ng 
for your int erest and sup';)ort in t he comi n g election ••• You knoH ·hat vre 
no r get f rom our National Admi nis tra.tion - Extra.va gant spending of our 
hi gh t axes; umds e planni n g of mili t e.I""IJ _ reparednes s ; Growing concern about 
t he ~o s sibility of s trorgCommunist inf l uence in our government; and a 
steady move toward complete control of our lives by the Administra t ion 
i.n. 1-Ja shington. By his mm boas t Senator Tydin gs is an important part of 
t hat Ad...minist ra.t i on . 
11 I f yo1.1 have already decided that you rlill vote for me, I want you to 
knm that I a:;?precia te your confidence in me . If you have not yet made u~ 
16 
your mind, I rlill sincerel y appreciate your consideration of my candidacy. 11 
There >?ere 85,000 copies of this letter distributed . 
Besides feeding ce.mpaign materia~ to group l eaders, J onkel came up ·Hi th a 
striking innovation in the distribution of lit erature . He called uuon the 
proprietors of Baltimore beauty parlors and barber shops and a sked per-
mi ssion to l eave hi s pha'llplets '1-li th them. His theory: it 1-ras in these 
pl aces uhere peo~ le read obsessively. The phamplet 11You Sure Did, Senator11 
rras one of t hose pieces of literature designed for barber sho· and beauty 
< arlor distribution. 
Aside from publicity activities, Jonkel attempted to organize t he Hork of 
local Republi can l eaders and to make use of dissident De.TTlocrats . Some of 
George 1viahoney 1 s f ollowers in the bitter Democratic gubernatorie.l rimery 
came to the Lord Baltimore Hotel and offered their services to Butl er and 
HcKeldin. There ¥m.s hel D also from other Democrat s ifho felt that 'l~:rdings 
had no t distributed ~atronage properly. 
As the campaign stretched into its final stages, newspaper began to take 
editorial stands. The Balt;mor e Sun, a Maryland political institution in 
itself, advised voters: 
"The Sun recommends Senator Tydings for re-election, not under t he 
illusion that he is the fla>-rless legislator by any mean , or th2.t hi s 
career has been free of error, but because he has served the State honestly 
I 
for f our terms, because his combination of level-headedness and experience a re 
16Kelley, op ,cit., p .l29. 
VPlua.ble at this time not onl y to the Sta te but to the nation . 11 
The 1/Jashin c:-ton Ti mes- Herald had been anti-Tydin e-s fro:r.J. the first a.11d was 
joined in thi s by a f e"H of :Maryland ' ,s county dailies, i ncluding the 
Hagerstown lviorning Herald and the Salisburv Times . Said the l a tter paper: 
11 A housecleaning of pi nks, Reds and fellm-r travellers and Communists from 
our govero..ment i s due . Sen?.t or ~flings had the op. or t uni t ;;.- to ~o i t . He 
failed. The peopl e of Haryland owe it to the peopl e of the United Ste te 
that he shall not have the same opportunity a gain. 11 
I n the l ast three a.11d one-b2.lf days of the ca'lli)aign J onkel u s ed 465 spot 
an:.0.ounce~nents for Butle r in an att empt to 11 give the name of Butler over 
and over a.ga.in . 11 One spot , in the manner of the familiar Bromo-Seltzer 
advert ise<:lent, droned 11 Be f or Butler, be for Butler, be for Butle r, be fo r 
Butler, be f or Butler, be for Butler, be for John !·1Iarsh2J.l Butler, Rspubli-
can c .- dida te . for Uni ted States Sena to r . 11 1\..nother erup ted '.-ri t h solmds of 
machine- gun f ire, the e:;.:plosion of a :motar shell, t he screech of a 
ricocheting bullet, and then, "Do you, in your heart, belie ve t hat we vrere 
re.s.dy for what happened in Korea., or could have ha::,Jpened some pl a ce el s e : 
Vote fo r John }'lar shal l Butl er, Renubl ican candida te f or the United St a tes 
Senate. 11 
111e.ny of these spot announce:nents -~rere u sed both befor e and after T-,tcU n g 1 s 
r adio spe e ches , causin g him con s i derable embarrassment an.c~ ma.1dng it 
h<irder for hiD to ,J efend hi;"'lself . 
Four days before the voters troo·oed to the pol ls, Butler headc~uarters 
!.6 . 
is~ued a four- ]Jage tabloid, tt r.'rm .. the Record. 11 I n it e.p_ e.:tred a ~JB.f!e of 
:9ictures under the heading, 11 Sen.s. tor Tyoj_n:·s s2ys : There is Not a Si n ::·le 
Pro-Com!111.mist in the Sta.te Depart ment, 11 pi ctures of O~o-ren La.ttiBore, 
Phi llip Jessup , Dean Acheson, John S. Servi ce, Haldore Ha.nson, Hil liam 
Remington, Gustave Duran, and one of Com.mun5. s t Earl Brmfder, e.p:pe.ren l y 
in int i.'lle.t e conversati on with Tydings . This pi cture vas ce:ption ed : 
11 COL'TLmunist Earl Browder, shmm a t l eft in thi s composite picture \laS a 
star 1-ritness at t he '1'-yclings c.orru:d.ttee hearings , and '.-ras caj oled into 
sc:.ying Oi·:en La ttimore and ot her s accus ed of disl oys1 t y were not Co:n.;,.,_ n-
i sts . Tydings (right ) answered : 'Oh, t han..k you , ~Jir. " Erowc.'l.er test." f i ed 
in t e best interests of t hose a ce sed, naturally. " 
Tl e gener al theme of t }1is docttment is revealed bY eo!n.e of t~e heA.d1in-s s 
given its s tor i s : "Senator Tydin gs Promised :robe, But Gc.ve \•; __ ite~-r:=tsh 
Insteecl, II 11 Tydi ne s Group Held u~) Ar.Tcs, " "Tydings Sponsored La tt:Lnore 
Lectures on Soviet Russia, 11 "Tydings ComEl i ttee Blamed for High Korean 
Ce.sue.1ties, 11 and "Tydings Ha.s :Uefended Acheson s·nce 1933." 
The na tion 1 s press 1 advers e comments on the ha.ndlj_ng of the loyal t;>r in-
ves tigation by the 'I'ydings committee vere reprinted, as were cartoons 
c1;1.rrying the sc:t!lle :.nessage f rom the Chi ce.go Tribune. 
Jonkel wan ted to vash his h£..n.ds clec-m of tli s t abloid, He cl·=d_:ned it im.s 
t)ro t~_ucer to s r..ti s f y the den1.sncs of some Butler supporters fo r 11harct-
hi ttiiJ.g fac t s . tt Senc:: tcr ikCart hy 1 office hed contributed the bull:: of the 
matel~ie.l, anc_ Fre.r..lc Smith, of the TiJil8s-He·,1 ald had vol unteered to do the 
uriting. The com:)osite pi cture idea was conceived b;r the TjJnes- HerE·ld 1 s 
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city edi t o r , Galvin 'I'<:m_:en::l e. r, c.f t s r &..11 act ·a l pho t o of 'l'yc.in:""s end 
Br m-rder t aken a t the he a r ing of the Tydings conuni ttee i-Tas r e ject ed as 
u.11suitable for the purposes at hand. 
Tydi n gs had t he choice of i gnori.11g or of a t t ein.pt · ng to e.nsFer uhe t .::tbloi c 
e>..nc. i -:o clP rzes. _ e hc:.d :'our da.:rs to deci de. On November 6, the n i ~h t 
o·.=fore th8 election, he sho>:ed a coyy t o '::is tel eYisi on eudience and 
den ounced it as SCi..nTilous . To Tydings ' recues t tha t he disavm-r the 
t ablo i d, Butl er r enlied that Tydin gs had tt s e en f it t o emlJlo;;r an old 
poli t i cELl trick . tt 'I'yd.in .. ~s had trie d t o arnear hi'n , Butler ~)ointed o•J t, 
'' by cl~-> i...1ling he has been smea red . 11 
On Hovanber 7 , Tyd:L11zs i as def eat ed . The t urnout 1-ras a reco::.·d . T[·.e 
nresident of t h e B:.l t i :::r..ore Boa rd of 81 pervisors of Elec t :! c::.s esti:rt:, t ed 
that almos t 75% of registered voters had gone t o the pol~s. Tydings just 
gar11ered 288 ,258 votes as compared to Butler's 326,286. 
I RECA.P.I TULATION 
The Ha ryland senatorial cmnpaign was fou ght out in an a t mosphere fill ed 
with the f og of stress and 1.mcer t aint y of Korean revers es a..."'ld. the muddy 
issu e s of l,IcCt::.rthyism. 
The set of is sues and influences were so complex tha t it would be neither 
possible nor a ccura te to a ccount the out come o f the e l e cti ons to any one 
single f a ctor. 
The es s entih conditi ons for the t wo ca11dida tes were t h e same however, they 
dif fered li1 t he way they met these conditi ons . Senator Tydings could 
il 
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en d. did rely grea t ly on his party's strength and proven capacities. This 
1-ras not poss i ble -with Butler. So they pl a ced, their attenti on in ano t her 
directi on: the professional propagandist. Jonkel bec2me the principal 
str.s.tegist of vote-gettinE: eff orts and t he mass media of communica tion a s 
the means of sarrying the messages to the voter. 
The Bu t ler sta rtegy relied heavily on the pmrer of issues to inf luence vo t e. 
The dominant issue wa s tha t of Communi s t s in government :.::.nd ~;dings' role 
in the Sena te investigations of McCarthy's cha rges against the Sta te 
Depar tment. By means of hi s 11 doubt11 teclLn.ique , Jonkel wa s able to a chi eve 
br evity and clarity in his canioaign themes. All he had to do 1-<as to 
a rouse doubts in the voters ' mi..n.ds. ~Jdings soon f ound himself being 
buried by an avalanche of doubts until he f inal ly became a victim of an 
imuossible demand for certainty. 
Some of Jonkel 1 s propaganda ec:1.oed with a resounding impact. He ai.rned at 
the Ce.tholic· vote . In the ~)redominantly Cathol ic first, s econd, and t h i r d 
wards in Baltimor e , vo ters gave small mar gins to 'I'yclin.~ s . He also dir e cted 
special a~)peal s to t he Negro. I n Baltimor e ' s 17th vrard, vrho se population 
i s nearl y 95% Negro, Butler captured 85% of the t'rTO-~ a r ty vote for 
Senator. \•Jhil e Tydings . he.d never been unusuall y popul a r wi th t he Negro 
voter, neverthel e s s he carried the 17th vrard 1d.:th 51% of the vot e i n 1944 . 
I n othe r Negro areas where he carried or los t them only by small margins 
in 19411., he lo s t them heavily in 1950. 
Tydings arou s ed little enthusiasm a~ong leaders of org~n.i zed l abor too , 
and his l ong career all oYTed these res entments t o a ccumul a te . 
!I 
L;9 . 
--~ 
Republicans, confident that they would capture the Governor1 ;3 mansion, 
were unusuall y active as an orgm1izati on in the 1950 election. 
The Butler headquarters , steered expertly by Jo~~el, was more prolific 
in the u s e of the mass media of cowaunication in politics. They were 
mor e sensitive to the problems of propagru1da distribution. The normal 
channels Here used as Hell as the l ess conventional and ~ robably more 
effective ones such as; opinion leaders, retail stor es, barber shops, and 
beaut' parlors. 
In the use of radi o, Jon.."l{el effectively and economically made use of the 
spot announcement as opposed to the Tydings radio speeches. 
He made things even more difficult for Tydings by using his (Tydings ) mm 
campaign literature against him. 
II 
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CHAPTER V 
COHPARISON OF THE PR \\fORK BEHIND THE SENATORIAL 
ELECTIONS OF THE TITO COUNTF.IES 
A close study of the two senatorial campaigns reveals striking similar-
i ties and dis s imilarities in the 1-Tay they were held. 
t 
To understand the i s su es a.11.d themes in each crunpaign and Hhy they were 
pl ayed up the way they were, it is n ecessar y for one to be familiar 
I 
¥ri t h the atmosphere prevailing in ea ch country at the time the campai gn 
took pl a ce. 
I' 
The Philippine senatorial campaign was held on the same year the great 
Pres i dent Eagsaysay ~ re:.::: killed in an airple.ne crash . Pres i dent 1'-1a gsaysay 
has undisputably been the best loved, most popular president in Philippine 
history . 'l'he masses held a f a ther image of him just the way the lllllerican 
people looked up to President Eisenhm-rer in the 1952 presidential elections ! 
To some, Magsaysay "1-l'as more than a me re ma.11.. He Has their saviour, a god . 
\>!hen he died, the masses mournfully asked: "lfuo will take care of us now?" 
\\!ham the presid ential and senatoria~ campaigi'ls took place a feH months 
later, everJ candidate promis ed the people he would . Or at l east, he 
tried to popularize himself and gain the a ccep tance and confidence of 
the voters by identifying himsel f ¥lith the late pre s i dent. This was done 
by means of tes timonials ( r eal and fabricated), pictures taken ..rith the 
pres i dent, and previous associati.ons the candidate has had vri t h the 
pres i dent. 
Like hungry and greedy sha rks, t 1ey tried to gna1f as big a bite as they 
could from the popular· t of the dead resiQen t. P rti es strove to 
iden tify their party and candidates with t he pres ident. The Liberal s 
ignor ed the fac t t ha t Ramon 'iagsaysay des erted them in di gust or the 
Nacionalistas . It ' s slogan boasted: "Hagsaysay Has our man, no Yulo is 
our Hav.saysay. 11 A n e1-rs aner headline rocl irned 11Hacc..pagal (Liberal vice-
pres i dential candidate) Pled ges Hims elf to h a&<saysay 1 i3 Ideals . 11 Manaha...'1, 
Pro ] e sE:ive Pa r t y ' s pres i d ential candida te , claimed that he is no less 
than t he reinca rna tion of the l a te Presi dent . He even •rent to t he e_:tent 
of havinc: hi s campaign pictures retouched so hi physi cal rese!nblance to 
Hag ays y wo1.: ld be enhanced. Hi s uo s ters carrie d a silly syll gi sm 
~-rhich decla red: " I f you love Nagsaysay, you love Manahan, i f you do not 
love Hanahan , you did not love lviagsaysay . 11 From every corner of the 
I slands , Phi l i ppine politicos invoked the ha~lmred name of Hags aysay . 
The iVIa.ryland s ena torial campaign of 1950 was f ought out in an a t mo s phere 
teeming 1-rith the s tres s and uncerta i n t y of Korean revers e s and the 
muddy i ssues of HcCarthyism . 11 \·,'hi te rash " bloomed into a di s t inctive 
-ooli t ical t he..me as t he Korean -vrar slowl y stretched in its uncer t ainty . 
In Ne'·! Yorl-::, Joh.n. Foster Dull s found thPt the Communists were i n Herbert 
L e0..rnal'l 1 s CoTner. In Florida , George S!nat her s dis tributed a boo __ let 
entitled "Red Pen' e r " e:md eac 1 day na.'1led a n eH " subversive" or 11 Cormnuni ; t " 
gr oup 1-1hich Sene.tor Cl E~ude Pe·o·ner had ;: t so:ne t:i.me addressed. In 
California, Richa.rd Ni on and his manager, Hurray Chotin -r , m de the 
i ss c t h basis nf t heir Ca!ll!Jaign a gai nst Hel en Gahagan 
I n Ohio , em:. tor Rnc ert Taft sa :i d the t t he entir e campai.gn 
against him had been blueprinted by convicted Corrununis t Gus Hall. In 
Utah, Republican -.rorkers distri buted a tabloid detailing the allegedly 
COilLT!lunist record of Senator Elbert Thomas. In Colorado, Senator Eugene 
l"lillikin charged that A.rnericans vrere dying in Korea because of Communist 
17 infiltration into the United States Department of State. -
B-y 1950, the cold var bubbled near its boiling point in Korea . For the 
political propagandist, exploitation of the co~mu_~ist i ssue carried an 
extremely attracti.ve possibility. In the a t:mo sphere of this particul ar 
year, if a candidate could be 1 exposed 1 a s really being "soft on 
52. 
Cormnunism11 his defeat would be automatic, not as a matter of party politics, 
but as one of patriotism. 
The Asian Internat ional Advertisers, Inc. did just what eveiybody else 
was doing. It 1 s main theme was t he identification of its candidate rrith 
the late President . Thi s theme was integrated into its campaign l itera-
ture, advertising, and speeches. Eve~r campai gn gimmick carried Presi dent 
Hagsa.ysay 1 s testimony of the candidate, be it a meino pad, calendar, or a 
matchbook. 
Jon Jonkel u sed the whitewash theme i n the Americen scene - but di ffered 
. I 
from other ca..rnpaigners in the way he pres en ted it. He vras aware that it 
Hould reauire a voluminous task to be able to prove that his candidate ' s 
onJonent was soft on Communism. He a ttacked the uroblem in a different 
uay . His pre-el ecti on opinion survey reveal ed that people did not know 
whether the Tydings investigation had been f airly conducted or not. He 
concluded that if they -.rere not certain, then ther e -.rere doubts in their 
minds. He de cided that this <rould be an easie r way of approach:i.ng the 
l'l Kelley, op.cit., p .l07 
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1,-: i teHash theme. He pl ::-, yed up the do bt t h<:tt e~. :i sted i~1 the minds of 
the voters. 
Bot_1 ca.'."'l:[lP.i gns ma d use of religion. Hmrever, AIA u s ed this ths:me much 
more e::;rtensivel y t han did J orJ<:el. Jonl-~.: el gave spc- cial attont :..on to the 
Ca tholic clergy me.inly bec8.use l:e was intereste ' in t he!n as oni nion 
leaders. I n the Phili~)pine ::.~ , t he Ca.th lie cl -r&;_'J e.re a lso consideJ•ed a.s 
such and nuch more . Politici t:ms con. i der the Ca tholic vote as vi tal , 
807i of t he :~Jo~ulation being Ca thol:i.c. To be frmmed u:. on by t he cl:.urch 
~-rould hav e a devast a. ting effect i f not a thurn.Ji ng def eat t o a candidat- . 
A !lon-CP.tholic candidate has a Chi nam n' s chance of i-rlnn.ing in an ele ction. 
In thA recent elec t ion, Bishop Hane~o head of the I gl esia n i Cristo ( a. 
reli :;ious sect in t he Philippine s ) , ;.ras re·(Jorted to hav e ~ l edged U):!JO:rt 
of t he members of hi s church to Pres i den t Garcia. It 'Should be not ed 
tr~a:t Garcia h i nself is a Catholic. I t was e s timated tha t .Man alo 
commanded some 400,000 votes. I f the elections had been a close f i ght , 
this sup~')ort would have be<m decisive. The 'Jres i ci ent of an ovei'\·rhelmingl y 
Ca tholi c PhililJ:?ines would be the candida te of the I gles ni Cris to. 
screa.,rl'o-;d the Yulo camp . ns v e t he Ca tholic Church from dominCJ.tion by 
Na..n ?.l o - hy voting for Yulo : 11 The n ame of God and t h a t of t he Virgin 
M<:l.r;-y we~:e invoked again and gain over the r adio in the s:=~me m.a.nner 
a co~~ercial Droduct is dru~ed on the ears of listeners. 
Neit her i s the e :ccessi v e use of religion new· in th Phil i..?pi ne noli t :tc 
Ever since the f irst ele c t " ons were held in t he Phili~;_?ines , t he re has 
o een ")eCi!:" l errmhasi s on rel i gi on . Hm-rever, l ast y ea r ' s el e ctions 
~-ri t n .:. sed an enormous and frightening a tte...m:Jt t o drag the Church into 
11 
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politics and government . Religion Has c n s i dered simpl y as one of the 
~Joli tica l ca..rn:!Jaign t he es. Nev.rest to c ome uo vras the sacrilegeous use of 
religious obj e cts for cru~aign hand-ou ts. An exru~ple was the di stribution 
of rosarie s with dog tags att e.ched bearing the name of t he candida t e and 
t he admonition to reme.111ber him on ele ction day . 
AIA phrased several other theme s directed snecific publics such as t he 
Sugar Bloc, the l\iAJ:.fARCO, the tea chers, and A ten eo AltUJLTli. 
J onkel i s sue d s· eci13l a.9peals t o the N gr o aml to l abor leader • 
As ho1-m by both &-udies is sues pl ay an important role in the Uni ted Ste.tes 
politics 1-rhile in the Philippines more concern is given to the candidate ' s 
i ndividuality than to b; s 
The uroblems thc-: t faced both carn:paigners at the outset of t1c ir cam:oE.i gns 
\-rere different. AIA uas concern.ed i n mak ing Ledesma to:;J the w-inning list. 
His ;-Tinning a senat e s ea t vras not much of a nroblem to them HhP.t ui th the 
Cathol ic church an the uouerful sugar bloc rall~ring behind. them. Ledesma 
a l r ea.dy had a mune in Philip:9ine 'Jol itic s . Jon_1cel, hm-rever vas faced 1-rith 
the rea t nroblem of publicizi n g Butler t o the voters who 1rere then un-
fa!niliar ;-ri th the candi date. 
Th e t Ho c ai1paigns differ ed in the 1-ray they were he.ndle d s the campaign 
~Jrogres sed. · Though Jonkel encountered a greater urobl c:rn at the very 
beginning of the campaign, 1i s over-all carrmaign oper a.tions 1-rere much 
- .ore Hell-or ganiz ed and carefully handl ed than were t ho s e of AI A. 
Jon~<:el star t ed out by conducting an :l_nfo:rm __ l opinion urvey . It Has 
c.. r· 
. ~ . 
this survey tha t reveale d to h:iJn the unfa.'1liliarity of t he voter s to t he 
Butl er na.me. Furths rmo r e, it should also be not ed thP.t his basic strate-
gi es and tacti cs wer e deepl y rooted in the fincHns:s of his survey, 
~ 3.rticul<.> r l y the fact tha t the voters did not knoH Hhethcr TIJ di.ngs had 
done a g0 oci. job as a Senate investigator or had covered up Conununists 
in t he State Depar~~ent. He designed his ca'119aign for Butler after his 
surve findings - and it uaid off handso!llely . 
AI A, on t he other, did not have a ny survey to start Ti th. It mapped ou t 
pl ans and strategi es as the f irm director thought vital and eff ective . 
Th s, it didn 't hc.ve a mea ure of the effec t of t heir propaganda or public 
perception o the issues and a che c ( on weaknesses its cam~)aign may be 
develoying in uarticular localities. 
In fact, t here ha.sn 1 t beee1 any n o.t i onal oph1ion survey s a t all in the 
Phil i ppine s ex cept for tho s e sma~l surveys t aken by individual business 
f i nns f or t heir ovm benefit. The re are no s pe ci f ic figures as to TV o r 
radi o sets o1-merships, or which of the ve.rious conununica t i on media has or 
is the mos t eff ective in the Islands . 
AI A, as Hell as other ~Jublic relr.tion s fi rms tha t yl ayed a role in the 
1957 el e ctions , had to depend on thei r knowled e of the Philippine voter 
ru1d on their feel for the pul se of Phil i _?'Jine politics . \.Ji t h no specific 
fact s and f i :ures to base their work on, t h eir operation s comprised a 
great deal of trial and error procedure. 
In their study on vrhy information ccunpaigns fail, Herbert H. Hyman and I 
Paul B. Sheatsley noted the importance of survey s to an informat ion 
I 
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d-. t t ' d h . t . f l bl" . . 18 1rec or o r o any oo y O!nn g o Jn u en ce pu lC op1n1on. 
They f ound that p eo:!_)le t end to expose themsel ves to i n f ormation Hl ich is 
congenie.l with the i r prior a ttitudes , and to avoi d ex posu r e to inf orm2 tion 
lvhich i s not con genial. The study further revealed tha t eX} o sure i n 
itsel f is n o t ali,ray s sufficient, tha t people Hill interpr e t t he inf orma tion 
in dif feren t rrays , a ccor din g to t he i r prior attitudes, th11t i ndi vi uals, 
once t hey a r e expos ed to info rma tion, chane:e thei r vi ews di fferen tia l ly , 
10 
ea ch i n the light of hi s mm pr i or a ttitude . / 
Hyman en d Shea tsl ey concluded tha t t hos e respons ible f or inform~tion 
crunpa i gns ca.n..not rely s im_ l y on 11 i ncr easin g the f lm,r 11 to spree.d t heir 
i nforma t ion effecti vely . 
"(These) . . sy chological b a r r i e r s ••• create r ea l p robl 8Ill s f or t r ose charged 
1-ri th the tas~: of info rming the pu blic , and in many ca ses public opinion 
surveys off er the onl y means by whi ch the s e ;Jroblems can be r e co &_n i z. ed, 
an d t hereby ove r come . 
Su r veys a re a lrea.dy widely used t o provide t he information d j rector ri th 
sci en t i fi c 1mmdedge of the au anti tative d · s tribution of hi s ma t e r i al . 
They c1:m t e l l hi m how many people have been rea ched by his inf on n.e. t i on , 
and more i.m::_:Jortant, which particul ar gr oups have not been r ea ched. 
Surveys , t oo, can qu ite easily mea sure public int eres t i n i n fo r ma t ion 
ma t erial s and a r eas , t hu s providi n g him ;fi th a.c cu r a t e knowl edge of the 
handi ca 'IS hi s -p r ogr am f ce s ithin va rious populLtion gr oups . 
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B t o .., differen t and higher l evel, urve;rs can inform the i nforme.tion 
director of the 1-lhole st!'l, ct 1r e of a ttitudes on an public i s "'v e . They 
c&n t el l }1_j_- t h e me.jor fac tor s affecting public o~;in:.on on the i s slc., .nd 
t he rela t i ve inf l uence of t h e se va.rious f a ctors in determining ttitudes. 
They c:m tell to '.rhat e 'tent informat.:on h:-. s r eached the publ i.e a.nd .o ... ·, 
f r it h s chen ed existing oDinions . Th~y can also tell wh·t infOJ.."'TlPt ' on 
i s s till neaded and vhat asnects of it must be . tres s ed in order to reach 
the une:>-~:;-osed or unsympat hetic ~roups . 11 20 
After cond1 cting h j_s survey , Jon (el began his camoaign ·Hark. All he Has 
concerned a t the outset ,. as to publicize Butler ' s name with t he uroo e 
of creatin~ a.n ill11s ' on of victory 
21 
vote. 
for t .e candid te, and con cen-:.rat in_:: 
o :'inning a maj ori t unit 
re on the mov ements of Butle r ' O) 'Jommt and d:.rected Butl e r 
into those countieq 'lvhere the opponent 1vas S~)Pnding litt le -'-.i mP . 
There were indica tions ·oo that AlA ~lid kee~) an ey e on fer· ile ca.m~;e.ign 
grounds but th " senm ~d to pey more a ttenti on to those l)l a ce. vrher 
Ledesm i-Tas e C'~e c · all s trong . 
20Ibl. ct-. , c: 30 D o ·' • 
ea ch county and eac:O. l f> gisla t i v di t r ict o f Bal t::..iilore 
is .zi ven a 1.mi t vote in ;>ri.'lla.ry el ctions. T_: e CE.ndida te ;ho r ce~ VPS 
"'· nlurali t y of votes in a cou nt y or district receives its full un:L t 
vot e i n h3. s ::;c rt;r st t e convent · on. In t 1: is WJ.y , it i Possibl e for 
a cEmdidEte to recei ve a mi.no ~i ty of the popular votes Hhile ca:?t uring 
el'lough uni t v tes to rin nom:i.na t i on ) 
Both ca."'llpai gner s wor ked ha rd to pl ant s tatements in n ewspaper s so tha t 
they could later quote t hem. Both had good contacts 1-ri th the press. 
Jonkel trie d n ever to be direct in hi s char ge s . Instead , he resort ed 
into quoting the direct cha r ges a gain s t hi s candida te ' s op9onent which 
Here mad e by other candida tes . He clai.TUed thot his campaign didn 1 t have 
any t hing personal a gains t Tydin gs, that all he want ed 1vas to pl ay the 
doubt t hat exi s ted in the minds of t he voters. But no ma t t er how indi r ect 
1 his charge s i-rer e, s till the tenor of his caillpai gn con s i s ted of mudslin ing 
~~ against the opponent. His literatur e contained reprints of newspape r 
edi t oria l s and car t oons on the 1>hi tewa sh theme. Some of his r adio spot 
&J.noun cements let listeners hea r ma chin e-gun fire, the e. _lo sion of a 
morta r shell , the s cree ch of a riocheti n g bul l et , and then 11 Do you , in 
y our heart, believe that 1,re w·ere r eady for wha t happened , in Korea, or 
could have happ ened s ome pl ace else : Vote for John ~mrshall Butler, 
Republican candidate f or t he United States Sena te ." .And to top it all, 
t his kind of a spot announcement 1ms often timed to come both before and 
after ~ydings ' radio speeches. Jonkel even turned ~Jdings ' campaign 
litera ture to his (Tydings) o~m disadvantage. By so doing , he pressed 
Tydings 1 ba ck to the W8~1. Through the doubts 1-rhich he magnified one 
a fter t he other, Jonkel successfully molded Tydings into a victim of an 
impossible demand for certain~. 
Compared to Jo~kel 's work, AIA's operations consisted more of a general, 
constructive per sonality play-up . Ledesma's ca.'llpaign litera t u re Has 
devoid of mudslinging of any sort. The caTJ.didate did not even hurl a.TJ.y 
char ges in his campaign speeches. 
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Both provided hmnan interest i n their campaign l it rz.ture such e.s describ-
ing t e ce.nd~_dn ~ ' s life with hi s family. J onkel again e::.:celled on this 
aspect. Flule AI A simpl y mentioned the number of children in Ledesma ' s 
fa:._ily a.ncl. th::~.t he arr&"1ges his tight s ched·ul e o e can S '1end ~no, "·h J.:.i:'l13 
f r 1is f&nily, Jo·1kel fe a t uri zed Butl er ' s l ife , _ i8 s truc.gl ss , hi s ide~l :~ 
i"1 ::t ve u' interest · ng , h'.'LlTl n, and rer.dabl e style. ( see ? .40) 
,J onke l a l s o e.JQJeri."llented with novel ·1.;ray s of overcoming readers resi2t.<'..nce 
to obviously political propaga~da . For his pi ctures , he u ed neople i n 
·0oses ty:,:i c2.l of t heir everyday l ife . Exa"llnl e i s the :9icture of a fe.Eler 
cnilldn cr a cou. Benec;.t h the ·Jictur e, t he ca.ption reo.d, "Senator 'l':'rdin.:rs h :: d 
ch2nce to Drov e to a l l of u s that there Here not Co:mmu.'l'lis t s in o r 
Goven 1'cilent . He l eft d oubt in my mind. I'm going to vo te for Jobn I ... 1e.rshall l 
Butl e r beca: se h e dll fj_ ght. Communi.sm in Govern.!lent. 11 A 'ji cture o f 
f2.rro.c::r :sil k ing a cmr i s no t ordinaril y pole.mic, and one has read the 
CP. <J'i~ ·_.:)n a l.."llos t before h e real izes that thi s p&rticul ar one is. 
Ca:n:p2.i g;.1 :;?ictures used in Leciesmc:. 1 s l i tera:b.'ire ccm; ::.red to t~1 o se used by 
Jon~:el , ,,rel1 e lif ele ss . Almost a l J of Ledesma ' s ce.m"?a:ign literature cc- rris cl 
In C'l r-r7 l1 p..: O' ' t h i s caJ.nDai g:.1 , J onkel _ad in his hands th,., ful J n:"e of the 
va riou s cormnu..'l'lica tim1 m2dia Thile AI A i-ras sha ckled 1-ri. th t he 1 i mi t<".V ons 
oi' t he communic~tion m .die. in the Phili ') · ine s . 
n th :: U_ i ted Stetes, th . r·e · re 1, 761 , rl a.il~.r n 1rsp2.~ ers u j_th a co~nbined 
circul c tion of 57,101,510 : 546 S1 i1t'1.ay "')B.Ders wi t h 
? ? 
L~7, l!J?., 2!.:.6 . - ~ 
') 
·· · -!orld .A.lma.ne.c, 
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In ths Phil :i.~ '_:> in'3s, there a re only 20 d:.:d l ;r ne~-rs~ . . uer . . Of 460 ;:> blice.tions., 
three- r: llArters a re 'Jr i nted in Hanila . This concentration i _:=; s~1m:n even 
more sha r ) l y by circulation: ha...11ila accounts for S'O?s of the S8le of all 
~">u.blics.ti.ons . Of the ?0 daily pc.)er s , 16 a re Dubli c.:hed in t~~ cEmital 
c ·i t y . Ten of the dail ies are in English, f ur in Chine se , one in SpF> . • ish, 
~ 23 2.nd one in Tage.l og (the n G>.t ione.l .Language). 
Th.ere >ere i1 t h e UnJted Stat es a t the end of 1957 , lt.6, l OO,OO television 
21;. 
sets in u s e i n 83% of t he n "'..t::i.on 1 s hom s. A resea rch re:_:J o l~t i ndi cated 
tha.t f or t he u eek ending September 15, 1956 , a.11 average of 7/ .,885,000 
') ~ 
adt l ts Hatched TV, spend::.ng 13 hours and 36 minutes each Fe s-l: . .. _' A survey 
Hhich had been conducted annual~r ince 19M3 revealed th<:' distribut ·on of 
TV 3et m-m.ers hi2_"1 among income gr otPJS. It s~cm-red that th~re are mo:-e TV 
set Oi'Il.er s i n the middl e income group than in the U:i_)per income gro 1-~J . 
TV 0\.mERS PER 100 F.iU'HLIF.S, BY I NCOI-!E GROUPS26 
Income gr c uu 19/cf:S 1952 .L955 
Unner 2 . 7 55 . 5 90 .1 
:iVii ddl e 1. 3 53 .7 so .6 
Lo ~rer 0 . 7 1:.3 . 1:. 6? .7 
Tota l 58 . 3 
In the ?hili~":_:Jins s , there i s just one TV s t ation in o~Jeration a.nd 1 2 ,000 
. 27 
sets in use in merel y . 05;-t> of the n a t :i.on 1 s homes . 
23-vlo:rld Corm.nunicat.':.ons , 195 7 , 0 . 91~ . 
?J,·viorl d Almanac, 1958, p . l .. 5 . 
~5Act~_vitv , Seut. 28, 1956, p ._3 . ~6v · a•e t ·m 1 0 ;_ M ~c •) 02 l 0 o ,, - ,·-:.0 - ) ~>, _ _. • . .__ . 
7Televis~on Fact book, 1958 S~Jrin "'-Summer , ·:J . ?9l. 
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till a n<:'1.rl;r-born babe in the communication fiel d i n t he Phil i)pi nes, 
having started onl y in 195 3, C~..nd due to t he ex-o ansive prices of TV set s , it 
\'Ould t2k '2 long before TV CEI.n set a f i rm f oot on the communication gr01.'.nd . 
T:1ere are lL9 million r adios in operation i n the United Stat es. This 
toted nu...'ll.ber brokgn down , there a re 53,300,00 r adios in U. S . homes ·"Jlus 
4.3, 800,000 seconde,r;:v s ets in t hese ho:!!les; 12 , 900,000 in busin e ss _. l a ces, 
8 28 ins titutions, etc.; and 3 ,500,000 auto radi os . 
On the oth<O r s i d e of the 1-mrld, the PhililJPin es ave 79,000 r adio sets. 
~"'i ve of the 10 transmi t,ters · re com.rn.ercially o)erc:.ted, ::!.. th 35% of broe d.-
t . t" d . ' d t , ~· . 29 cas m g Ene evoL.e o aaver ulSln g . Radi o i :Jrob abl:Jr the most ef£'ecti ve 
medium, even more effective than .L~e n o:>1.rs _  aper. This is bac~:ed b~ t he fact I 
that ne rs:oapers in the country a r e concentrated in H:cm:U a Hhich a c col nts 
for 90% of all publicat:Lons . There i s 8.l so the de~ree of l itera cy ·0roblem. • 
T 1ere a r e about 38% of the ·popula tion 1.rho can speak and read English . There 
a re seven main dialects a.11d over a hlmdred s econda.ry dia lects a l l over the 
I sls.nds . NeFS s tor i es printed in the nelrspa:~)er, no me.t ter how- rea.dable, 
rec:_,Jires cons iderabl e reading abil:i. t y and. e ffort on the part of the 
r eader . Hi th radio , all the public has to do is l is ten. 
Person c;.l c nta ct in political ca1np · gns in t he Uni ted States as srio ·.TI by 
J onkel ' s c &'D.!Jai gn, today receives a p rominent emphasis in the t h "nking 
and pl a rming of :?arty str a tegie sts . 
?~\>Torld Almana c, 1958 , :9 . 485. 
\iorl d Co:mmunicat1_ons, 19_:" 7, ] . 9L;. . 
A study conducted by Samuel J . El dersve l d on prope .. ge.nda ec"b 1ir ues and 
votin?' beh· v ;_ r s·nawed that the r e may be practi all y no dvantage of one 
uerscnal contact tech..ni q_u e over anotne r . 
TYPE OF' CONTACT AND VOTING BEHAVIOR.30 
Personal Cant ct 
VotLYl g Beh.s.vi r Students Party Phone 
(N=-4.0 (l~=2L: (N=33 
Voted 25% ?.9% 2L% 
Di d No t Vote 7 5% 7l~f. 76% 
100 100 100 
------
I ail 
Votin"' Behav.·_o r Stu 1ents Ration~,l :hor l 
& 
Hail 
Voted 2L% o cl U j:J 1 2~~ 
D"d No te Vote 76% 92% 88% 
100 100 100 
The effec t f De son-to-person ~;:c- es ures , the st d:' concluded, ' ..r8.S to 
] enetra te beyond tho s e characteristics which already predisposed per ons 
to vote and compensate fo r the absence of s1 ch ~JrediSJ osin f .. ctors in a 
n mber of ins te..nces . Tl1ose uer son s Hho 1-rer e conta cted in t he exoerimen t 
JOAn a rticle 11 Experimental Propaganda Te chniques and Vot ing Beha.vior11 
bu- Sarrmel J . El ders vel d in 11 Pol i tical Behavior11 edited by Heinz 
Eul e .. u, Se.muel J. El dersveld, JYiorri s Jan::mitz ( The F'ree Pres s , Glenco e , 
Ill.' 1956), '/ . 14 
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and who voted were much lm-rer in political informe.tton l evel. The p8r s onal h 
conta cts, since they were 1nore eff ective in brir1 gi ng out t he vote !!!ore 
than any other t ech.'1ioue, 11ppear to h r-.ve induced some competent and Hell-
informed -o eoDl e to vote 'rho otherwi se might have stayed hom, but also 
Jl brought out to the polls some "Hho 1•ere very ooorly informed . 
The author sa"H grea ter diffi culties in activa.t ing consi stent non-voters 
in all e l ections but hopefully assert ed that u.n.der certi an circu.'lls t :om.ces 
1 these a~ athetics can be brou ght to the polls. He held t hat the personal-
i zed approach seemed more ef?ecti ve than ma:i_l p ropa.gande. , "1-rhet:b"' r the la t te'~" 
-- -~ -1 
i s of an informe.tive, r a tional t~e or of a moral t ~J e. 32 
Pers nal contacts :ol e.yed a smal l r ole i n AIA ' s operations compar ed to the 
bulk of m "1 yropagand a. it turned out . But it did make u se of the s o-
called 11 \·Thi s~)ering Campaign11 'hrhich could be considered to he.v e nl ayed a 
vi tal and effective role in the votes uhich their cP.ndidate garne red . 
Both ca1n" a igne r s bought re.dio ti.'lle mainly for spot announcemen ts r e.the r 
for their can didate to del iver his spe e ches. Both a··Ji)arentl;<> he l d 
believed that the spot can deli ver mo :z.~e listen er s f or less mone;r th."'n an r 
othe r f or:n of advertising , whil e the verage speech rarely drc."HS more thC'.n 
5% of an audi ence potential. 
For ·or e- C.9...'ll:? i gn assessments , .J onkel 1 s stendard procedur e i as con tacting 
members of gr oups p l a ced in s ociall ,r sensitive osi tions. 
B.is survey included police desk-sergeat"l t s. He fel t tha t :'Jol " cemen, "frhose 
dutie s pl a ce them midway bet1-reen the public and the machin3ry of ·9oli t ics, 
31 Ibid ·_o . 21 5 
'?.'1 . , 
.J".Ibid. , ? • 216 
= 
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a r e a particularly valuable source of info1~ation on political .. I oplnlon. I 
Jon.lcel •ras also super-sensitive to the problems of :oropaganda distribution. , 
I 
He made u se of the normal channels of mass communica tion. But he made an 11 
innovation in the distribution of campcdgn li t erature 1..rhich can and should 
be adapted in the Philippine political scene f or f uture campaigns . Aside 
- 'I from the normal channels of distribu.tion, Jonkel u sed less conventional and 
perhaps much more efficacious one s . He called upon the proprietors of 
beauty parlors, barber shops, retai l stor e s ru1d asked permission to l 3ave 
his phrunplets with them. He theorized that it Ha s in these places tha t 
people read obsessively. 
I 
I 
II 
I 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Tl e ubl . c rela tions •rork behind t he Ledesma campaign can gene rally be 
regarded to t ypi fy t he ent i r e scope of pol i tical public rela t ions in the 
Phili pine s today . 
The s t 1:dy revealed that AIA was more interested in cr eating a public image 
from its candi da t e 1 s indi vidu.ali t y and publici zing this i mage as vti c',el y as 
t hey could - r a ther than i ssues. 
I n all i ts cainpaign material, it tried to i dentify the C&'1dida te 1-:ri th t he 
late President !-ia gsaysay, made use o f r eligion, and magnified the candi date ' s 
a ccomplishment s . These issues 1-rere presented t o t he mas s e s in seemingl y 
diff erent packa ges - but stripped of the various a ttractive trappings , they 
all boil ed do -n to these three issue s. 
Never i n Phili ppine political history has public relations pl E>.y ed so reat 
a r ole as i t did in t he 1957 elections . Every polit ical pa.rty organi zed 
a ::.mblic relations ma chine to the l :L"'Tlit of its finances. Full u s e Has 
made of the newspapers , the r adio al1d t el evision, mobile units , po s ters , 
brochures and oth~r pr :nted l iterature, souveni rs and gifts and in desper-
a te cases, cash. Garcia buttons -.rere reported to have been handed out vi th 
ten-·oeso bills . (Time, Aug . l ) • Par t y Harke r s pas s ed out "peso s and-
viches, 11 end all sorts of gifts , r anging from shirts to rosaries, e 1:1.ch 
bearing the candidate ' s name . 
Judgi g f om the analysis ' r esults of t he Ledesmfi Caiilpe.ign, the candiClate 
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did not. have as m ch m n-y to t hrow as t he other candidates d i d. Camp~1ign 
literature and n eHS r eleases uere the main channel s by '1-rhich Ledesma ' s 
public relations men hoped to convince the electorate to put their c~~di-
date t o the Senate . SpeciaJ. appea~ s were directed at specific publi cs 
such as the Ca t holic sect:.on of t he country, the suga bloc , the Na tional 
Harkettin- Corooration gr oup, t he te cher s , and t o a small but ouit e i n-
f luenti al s e{?l'1en t - the Ateneo aluiTL11i. 
Althou gh radio was the main ba ttlegr ound vrhere verbal war s w·ere -vra.ged and 
1-rhere i ssu es were dru..rnm.ed incessantly on the listeners ' ears duri n g the 
pre-election campaigns, Ledesma ' s AI A did not exploi t thi s medium .. Hadio 
time i as bought only for s ot announcements. But it di rected its eff o r ts 
a...11d i nfl uence in e;etti n g radio s tations t o int ervic H t h ir candida te a 
oft en as uoss ible in their public service broadcasts . This way , AI A hoped 
t o overcome the resistance of radi o listeners who v ere obviousl y bored -vrl t h 
the political pr opa_anda they have been gett ing f roi'l the radio almost 
eYery minute of the day. Not only did this prevent the listeners f rom 
sv:ri tching thei r die~s t o another station , but the candida te Has able to 
plug hi s i ssues during the intervieH without co s ting him a cent avo. 
The analysi s of the publ ic rela tions operations for Lede sma revea.led a 
constructive personality pl ay-up and was dev~d of mudslinging of any sort. ' 
Cam· a i gn l i t e rc ture, ne1-rs releases , and spee ches m.?.de by the dandida te 
carried no '?erson al cha.rges a ains t t he opponents . I t silnply reli ed on 
the candidate ' s public and Ca tholic record and i denti f i ed Ledesma ,n_ th 
t he le.te Pre s i dent Nagsaysay tb.J:Y ..mgh the use of tes timonie.l s 2nd pictures 
of the candidate <rith the l a te p res i dent . 
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Al though Lede sma 1 s campaign seems purer than the other ca'll:_:mi gns, i t Ha s 
not enti rel y i.r.ll!lc..culate. Lede sma. ma.de a point f rom the very- beginning 
tha t hi s ca<n.~)aign be hel d on the l evel and di rected his public rel a t · ons 
men not to j oin other cam_ a.ig;ner s in the political mire. However, AI A 
found it hard to abide by this at t ime s and had to resort to t he di r t y 
tactics of politics. For instan ce , in pl a ce s vrhere Ol)position candi dA.tes 
1- ere particula rly s tron g, Led esma ' s name va.s ins er t ed in the s a'11ple ballots 
of the othe r parties or of those candidates who 1-;rere s trong in t hose 
pl a ces . AIA al s o pr actised 11 horse- tr:;.d:i_ng" and made secret n egoti e.tion s 
1-rith the nolitical leaders of the o t h er partie s. These were pr a cticed 
without the knm-rledge of Ledesma. 
I t has been pointed ou t that public rele,tions men eo about moldLn.g publi c 
opinion and selling their political product by the s ame basic techni _ues 
I 
I 
h 
1. 1- hi ch sell s oap and cars. l''urt hermore , recent studies on political behavior ! 
have indica ted that the act of vo t i n g can 1-rel l be used as a paradigm for 
many other a ctivities - tha t the decisions the modern man makes every few 
years in the political areana are simil a r t o tho s e he make s everyday as a 
I con sumer of goods and services. 
II 
Eesults of the study of AIA ' s opera tions ~-rould appea r to su:pport t hese 
contentions. Fr om the merchnndi zi ng point of vieH, there i s actually no 
di ff erence a.t all . Bo t h political product and conm;ercial produ c t must be 
sold to the people and t he people mu s t , somehm-r, be made to buy . It may 
further be said. tha t one can sell anythin g i f he knoHs how. Tha t it is 
I 
di.ff i cul t to distingui sh one brand of t oothpaste or one politician from I 
another , but with the proper technique , one can be made p ref erred from the 
I 
I 
r est. Th t people can be made to buy t hings t hey do not ne ed, vote a 
candide.te iiho is corrupt and >-rill abuse his pm·rers once ves ted in hi m 
i f t he right approa ch is u s ed. 
I 
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Hoi·rever, more complexitie s are i nvolved in winning a vot er t han i n gett ing 
a n eu buyer. 
Ir:. s ell ing a ca r or a toothpa s te, design a gene ral promotion progr Biil. f rom 
which specific programs would be patterned after - a.nd you can sit ba ck 
, and relax as long as you possess reasona ble f i nancia l ba cking . I f you a r e 
selling a neH toothpaste, y our client does not eJcpect y ou to ove r turn the 
t ables overnight on established brands such a s Colgate or Pensodent. As 
long as t he toothpaste is gaining public accep t cmce no matt er how slo;.r , 
ou 1 re s till in business. On the other hand, in politics, your candida te 
has to 1-rin the elections or you are a failure. Neithe r is i t enough to 
have a def inite program in election campaigns. You have to change you r 
pr ogram ~~d techniques accordingly as the needs and conditions of the 
times require. In politics, things undergo a charn-eleonic change. Your 
progre~ today may be useles s or even detriment2l tomorr ow. A succes sful 
political public relE.tions man is one iiho 1-dll be able to st~:md these 
pres sures of every changing conditions and be able to adaut fu · s pr ogr am 
to the conditions. 
The voter ' s decision is harder to inf luence in tha.t this parti Cll l P.r 
decision concerns more ego involvement than in buying commercial products. 
The decision he me.ke s inside the voting booth i s much more :Lrnporta.nt 
and vithl than the decision he make s in the drugstore counter. He me.y 
ha ve been persuaded to buy a bad soap but after u sing it once ·Hill simply 
refuse to buy it again and can j ust t ry a.not he r brand. But once he has 
'I voted a candi da t e, he knows he will be s tuck with him until the ca11di dat e 1 s 
I 
" I 
I' 
I 
II 
I 
term expires . 
These contentions I have made a re strongl y supported by the genera.l 
I 
Phili ppine election returns. The results of the 1957 electic ns present a 
1
, 
seemingl y confused pictur e of the electorate. It is diff icult to explain u,J 
the victory of one is negatived by the defea t of the other, if ca111paign I 
technicues a re to be the ba sis of comparison. 
A Presi dent and a Vice-Pres i dent belonging to diff erent parties 1,rere 
elected. This mar ked an unprecedented turn in Philippine political 
his t ory . Not even in the history of ~~erican politics has this polit ica l 
phenomenon ever occur red. 
Almost all parties and candidates carried out their campaigns w~th t he u s e 
of t he same tech..ni ques: i dentif ication Hi th the late President Magsaysay, 
the handshake, and the u s e of religion. 
The mo s t interesti n g varia tion in the recent Phili ppine ele ctions is the 
cla i m by all the ma jor candid ates, *i th the excep tion of Sen a tor Cla ro 
H. Recto , t ha t they are the best-qualifie d to continu e the Nagsc:w say 
pr ogram. The Yulo camp, ignoring the f a ct that Ma gsaysay de serted the 
Liberal part y in disgust and joined the Na cionalist as, boasted tha t 
11]\·Iagsay s ay was our guy, now Yulo is our lvJ.agsay say . 11 Ivlacapagal a f ormer 
cr itic of the Magsaysay administration , pledged himself to the 11Ma gsaysay 
I deals.u Manahan claimed tha t he wa s the reincarna tion of the l a t e 
presi den t and had his pi ctur es retouched to enhance his rese~blence to 
t he hero of t he masses. Presi dent Garcia (who won the election) also 
procl imed l oyalty to t he Ivlagsaysay program - and he probably ~-ras i n t he 
bes t position to do it since he was, after all the No. man in the 
l'1agsaysay team. 
The handshake has also emer ged as a common denominator in Philippine 
:9olitics. This is also true in American politics although t he handshake 
i s not a s big a denominator in this country as it i s in t he Philippi ne s . 
This may seem strange. George "Hashington considered t he offi ce of the 
pr esident so exalted that , while occupying that position, he did not 
think it proper to shake hands with anyone. Yet, he 1·f8.S reelected once 
I 
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and could undoubtedly have been reelect ed many more times had he desired. 
In fact, he was offered a crmm. But as Magsaysay proved, the greater 
the number of hands a candidate can s hake nowadays, the more votes he 
can get. For thi s reason, all the candidates and their wives (daughter 
II I 
II 
in the cas e of widov-rer Yulo) fanned out to tmms and barrios to shake 
as many hands as possible. Champions in this depP.,rtment was ex-Judge 
Qurino and Han ahan. Freer to devote their ent i r e time to handshaking, 
they 1.,rere repor ted to have visited more provin ces, more toims and barrios 
than their riyals. 
'I 
The other t rend glowed with the halo of religion. Candidates brandished 
'I 
their Cat holi c records and achievements, before the Catholic hierarch I 
and the Catholic population with the hope that their church and its 
members. All parties came out with publicity pictures shovdng t heir 
candidate "fervently" at prayer ins ide a church or getting a bishop ' s 
:j;.._ 
I 
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'' bless ing. The Liber al P2crty even went to the extent of clahaing that 
32 out of .38 archbis hops and bi shops and 95% of the Catholic priests were 
for candidate Yule. Thi s was vehemently denied by the Ca tholic hierarchy . 
But the Liberc~ Party s tuck obstina tely to t his claim up to election day. 
They considered the masses as stupid. They thought the people would vote 
for anybody if enough shir t s, cigarette lighters , pencil s, and pl ain 
col d cash Here given away, and if enough signs neon-lighted, enough radio 
t i:.ue bought. 
I Election day came and as returns started pouring in, candidates bega.n to 
re&lize that t he masses Here not a s s t upi d as they theught t hey were. 
The s trategie s they employed to influence public opinion obviously failed . 
From the way they voted, the people manifested that t heir vote cannot be 
bought nor are they easy prey fo r glittering generalitie s and pr omises . 
They l<..ne1-r that no one of the candidates could fill Hagsaysay 1 s shoes, no 
matter hm-r hard t hey tried to make the people believe they could. 
:tvlagsaysay started the handshaking campaign and it worked so successfully 
that candidates in las t yea1.~ 1 s election once more exploited this aspect . 
Antonio Quirono was said to have been the champion in the handshaking 
campaign and probably shook more ha..nds than any of his rivals . But he 
lost. He fini shed a poor fifth, garnering only 60,328 votes. 
The use of the Catholic religi on did not seem to have been effective a t 
all ei ther. Candidates who were in good graces with the hierarchy 
were mercilessl y def eated 1-rhile some 1-rho had been attacked by religious 
I 
I 
7?. . I 
quarters were nevertheless elected or reelected. 
One point of speculation vhich would not pass away for some time i s 
whether Yulo los t in spite of Church support. I f this i s true , then the 
Catholic vote after all is just a myth. How·ever, i f in the negative, 
the only reason t hat coul d account for his defeat 1ms that the Church 
vras only nomi nally interested. The latter seems to be a s t ronger and a 
more probable reason. The Catholic Church was not especial l y i nterested 
in l as t year ' s election a s it ·Has in 1953. Las t year, Cthol i c candida.tes 
were spread among practically all the parties and to the Church it did 
not matter much which party ;-ron. Another possible reason i s th_ t an 
organized Catholic political movement may be self-defeating. I t can lead 
to schism w~thin and harmful attacks without. 
Nevertheles s , there was a clear attempt to drag the Church into politics 
and government , ;.,rhich also includes the danger of dragging politics and 
governmen t into the church . 
This 1-ras viewed with grea t alarm by many circles. Roseller Li-m, ;.,rho 
Has reel ected i n spite of r eligi ous attacks from rel igious or pseudo-
religious quarters , announced that he vrould int roduce a bi ll in the Senate 
t hat would make the use of r eligion for political propaganda a criminal 
offense . 
He recalled that i n the r ecent elections,many candidate s were defeated or 
their chances of victory lessened because of unfair and insidious pro-
paganda brancU.11g them anti-Catholi c or irreligious . I n hi s bill , Lim 
proposed that any person f ound directly or indirectly res onsible for 
I 
I 
I' 
I' 
:I 
II 
II 
I' 
I 
I 
II 
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using religion as electi on propaganda >-rould be puni shed by a f ine of not 
l es s than one year nor more than 10 year s , or both, in the di scretion 
of the court . 
El aborating on his measur e , Lim cited the cir culation of poster s, leafl ets I 
or simi l ar medi a 1.,rhere t he r eligious beliefs or l ea_r1ings of certain 
candi dates in the last elections were played up to i ncite the hate or 
dislike of thei r correligionists. He 1-rarned that if these pr actices 
continued., there would come a ti111e Hhen the religious '1-rars of the Hiddl e 
Ages woul d be revived , r esulting in fre.tricial strife in the country . 
Besides, he added, this tendency of using religion as an i ssue smacks 
of religious int oler ance and violates the principle of separation of 
church and state as l ai d dmm in the country ' s constitutional system. 
This is a sound suggestion for a heal t hi e r democracy in the Philippines 
and this measur e or some similar means should be adopted in t he 1960 
election s to put a halt to the use of r eligion in pol itics. 
At the eleventh hour during the 19.4.6 presi dent ial ele cti ons campai gn , 
Mrs. Quezon(h~fe of then l ate firs t pr esi dent of the Philippine 
Commom-real th) produced a l e tter which President Que zon had addressed to 
Gener al l1acArthur about Nanuel Hoxas, one of the t wo candidates for 
president. In the l etter, Quezon practically declared Hoxas his 
political heir. And Mrs . Quezon testified to i ts authenticity. 
It is safe to say that Hoxas 1 folloHi ng victory could be accounted 
l argely if not totally to this endorsement . 
In l ast year ' s el ecti ons , however, the re seemed to have been l ess 
I 
II 
I 
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sentimental voting. Antonio Banzon lost his congressional bid in Bataan 
in s pite of the fact that he is the brother of l'1agsaysay 1 s widou and the. t 
the former first l ady concentr ated her political support and prestige 
behind rJUn. Eliseo C~irino, former provincial governor and bro t her of 
a l ate president, also lost as a candidate for congr e ssman in Ilocos Sur. 
Congressman Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. of Rizal, brother of t he Provincial 
Governor and s on of the Sena te Bresident,. ~-ras over~-rhelmingly defeated by 
a newcomer , Bene dicta Pe.d:illa. 
l·lha t about the use of the various communication media ? Has the 1957 
election able to find out uhich is the most effective medhun in Phili:opine ' 
I 
political campai gning? 
B.adio 1-ras considered to be the most eff ective medi um. The four major 
parties spen t t 1-ro million pesos fo r radio ti.rne, a c co:!:'d i n g to the 
commis :::Jion on elections. The Liberals 1-rere s a id to have used this mediU!m 
more than any other party . One broadcasting sy stem repartee_ hav-lng sol d 
a que.rter of a million pesos worth of radio ticlle to the Libera l s . 
Yulo bought the l argest amount of r adio time. He had the biggest and 
best-heeled public rela tions machine behind hi.-rn . Yet he lost. Those 
endle ss r adio co:mr-nenta.rie s and intervie iJ in s tead of garnering votes , 
alien a ted annoyed re.dio listeners. I f only a survey would be taken 
on hov Yu+o ' s ra_dio pro gr ams were rece i ved by listeners, they Hould 
II 
I 
I 
I II I 
I 
! 
:mo s t p r obably dra1-1 rock-bo t tom rating . But hoH could_ his public rela t ion s I I 
II 
l1 
:machine h ave failed hi1::-;? For exampl e , the greate s t s er vice h e 1-ra.s 
supposed to offer to the nation uas his t alent as an economi s t. He ba ck ed 
••-t ;._- ' =::=~·-=====-= -~ _l . , 
II 
t his u9 by- his "p rogressive and sound management" of his Canlubang 
estate and also recalled that h e had advis ed presidens from Quezon to 
l'·ia.gsaysay . 
\IJhat ha9pen ed was tha t his is sues ricochetted on him and caus ed his dmm-
fall. Over-harping of his Canlubang property converted it into a symbol 
of C.iscredi ted l andlordism and l ed to his govern.rnent loans. I t i-ras 
also pointed out by his opponents tha t he had also advi s ed t he wor s t 
administration, that of Quirino. \IH1ich all po[;nts to the fa.ct that what I 
Yulo l a cked vas a. theoretician 1-rho could h a..rnmer out and cryst allize hi s 1: 
i ssues i nto an integr a ted philosophy of government and to his favor . 11 
The pi cture of the 1957 Philippine election viewed in its entirety, 
to 1-rhat e .tent did political propaganda influence the election? From the 
1 
study mc.de, t he propagan da employed Has not able to i nflu en ce the ele ction 
decisiv el y . The mo s t convinci n g p roof of t his is the l e ction of a 
pres i dent and a vice-pre s i dent belonging t o dif' f'erent parties , and the 
cross-voting f or seantors, regard~ess of' propaganda ma chine, issues, or 
even t he use of religion. 
Judgi n g from the 1-my they ca.st their vot es , the p eople t ook a great stride 
tmmrd mature democracy. I n t his particul a r ele cti on, they refused to 
b e blinded by gi f ts or be rron over through ha.ndsha.ke s. They manifested 
tha t they w·ere more interested in what an individual reall y is r a the r 
tha..n Hha t he promise s to be. 
A s tudy of political public relations in the Philippine s as it exists 
today, reveals a guilt of wha t Professor Arnol d Toynbee calls t pe 11 i doliz8.J 
II 
76 . 1l 
tion of an e_ ha"'lleral technique. 11 It pos s ess es a tendency of adopting 
instead of adaptin g techniClues tha t had been successful in pa.st ca.rnua i ms . I - - - ~ ~ 
p Only by means o f a much mor e thorou gh stu dy o f t he public J the ex i sting 
I 
11 conditions of t he time and a careful choice of techniqu es cmJld "90li tica.l 
')Ubl ic relations in the I slan ds hope to succes s fully i...1fluence and svray 
uublic ouinion over to thei r side. 
II 
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Republic of the Philip~ines 
CO~ll~ISSION ON ELECTIONS 
Manila 
PROVINCES PUYAT TOLENTINO BALAO DE LA ROSA LEDESMA 
A bra 11,570 8,740 12,399 9,737 8,052 
II Agusan 14, 187 12, 308 13,261 9, 279 12,118 Ak.l an 22,694 20,851 Hi, Ml 18,235 22 , 486 
Albay 37,690 28,514 26,321 35,560 25' 380 
Antique 19,472 17,007 16,107 15,325 23,167 
Bat aan 16,713 17, 670 12,202 19,901 8, 292 
Batanes 1,412 1, .4~3 1,608 523 1,035 
Batangas 42,991 55,552 32,626 27' 331 27,875 
Bohol 82,583 76,142 79,422 29, 482 77 , 618 
Bukidnon 11,008 8, 785 8,649 4,262 7,678 
Bulacan 55 , 504 63,206 43,468 63,232 34,518 
Cagayan 25,764 20,176 57,048 14, 938 12,154 
Camarines Norte 17,837 14,584 15,093 16,221 9,866 
Ca.'Ilarines Sur 44,970 32,643 34,258 47,286 33,046 
Capiz 18,969 17,275 15 ,644 24,912 23,840 
Cata.Tlduanes 14,149 13,084 12,474 8,006 11 ,~.32 
Cavite 30,325 31,582 26, 829 25,868 21,033 jl 
Cebu 95,969 87,776 77,868 28,422 88,858 
Ccitabato 52,842 42,326 40,261 31,804 39,265 I Davao 56,557 49,385 49,568 17,141 47,797 
Ilocos Norte 33,646 23,520 25,254 35,402 15,084 
Ilocos Sur 33,651 26,165 40,323 34, 265 20,125 
Iloilo 68,176 52,120 37,551 48,158 108,888 
I I sabela 23,470 21,127 38,697 19, 712 11,951 
Laguna 35,338 36,322 28,540 35,991 16,743 
Lanao 24,672 17,899 15,842 14,135 15 ,890 
.La Union 28,276 22,881 28,906 37,787 15,756 
. Leyte 92,629 89,396 84,730 50,583 89, 226 
Marinduque 13,766 10,523 10,989 7,773 9,386 
Has bate 20,430 15,775 19,313 15,872 14,816 
Ivlisamis Occidental 21,812 17, 375 17,431 14,472 16,558 
Misamis Oriental 24,191 18,912 18,679 9,266 17,750 
Mountain Province 20,497 10,617 20,331 12,661 12,463 
Negros Occidenta~ 65,154 50,588 55,281 49, 947 81,262 
Negros Oriente.1 35,032 32,221 31,902 2,287 36,863 
Nueva Ecija 30,643 24,894 21,009 35,216 11,935 
Nueva Vizcaya 9,9311- 8,930 14,060 9,113 5,090 
'! Occidental ~lindoro 7,658 7,406 6,208 6,670 5,664 
Oriental Hindoro 17,951 17,915 13,205 14,248 10,507 
Pal a wan 12,528 10,995 10,605 8,940 9,910 
Pam pang a 89,417 27,739 14,431 91,678 17,078 
Pangasinan 106,961 98,641 92,591 119, 767 75,605 
Quezon 50,345 43,156 40,209 39,459 24,268 
Rizal 73, 066 96,849 69,152 84,771 45, 272 
Romblon 12,217 11,431 9,946 11,002 11,461 
Samar 56,057 1:.8' 556 49,097 36, 564 42,942 
· a-.I'ae go - ,o __ 2 ,322 ___ 8 109 2.1 26 - 25 246 
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CANVASS OF VOTES CAST FOR SENATORS IN 
THE REGULAR ELECTION HELD ON 
NOVEM~ER 12 2 1227 
PROVINCES PADILLA LIN PRIMICIAS LOCSIN DELGADO 
A bra 9,54-S 8,737 3,756 6,056 5,465 
Agusan 5,888 13,625 10,255 9,1~92 10,864 
Aldan 16,994 19,267 17,139 20,140 17,240 
Albay 31,083 25,118 19,971 23,232 20,883 
1 Antique 15,890 17,075 13,693 16,939 15,678 
Bataan 14,272 7,606 6,359 5, 786 8,674 
Batanes 628 1,596 832 947 655 
Batangas 59,136 25,818 17,499 20,695 21,587 
Boho1 31,4.93 79,525 72,573 76,121 73,058 
Bukidnon 3,236 9,508 7, 41+9 7,085 6,703 
Bulacan 65,318 29,565 25,518 24,186 67,312 
Cagayan 13,093 15,176 17,476 10,342 10,821 
Camarines Norte 12,259 11,121 9,223 9 , .t,35 10,44-S 
Ca;.-uarines Sur 38,180 31,153 18,676 27,973 27,640 
Capiz 19,505 18,049 13,975 19,801 13,933 
Catanduanes 6,842 10,416 9,387 11,191 10,884 
Cavite 22,123 18,701 15,690 15,479 18,479 
Cebu 38,489 73,272 68,024 76, 913 75,255 
Cotabato 20,099 47,039 59,048 32,997 31,338 
Davao 16,487 54,027 45,811 46,207 42,562 
I1ocos Norte 35,284 18,739 24.,361 16,451 13,281 
I1ocos Sur 36,41.,.3 20,113 25,4.83 15,121 15,686 
Iloilo 64,885 45,504 33,674 45,598 31,818 
Isabe1a 17,729 11,900 16,493 9,759 10,040 
Laguna .30,624 14,877 11,1~31 10,452 1.3,064 
Lanao 10,821 24,542 15,267 16, 265 16,012 
La Union 34,289 16,098 23,410 11,381 12, 295 
Leyte 50,356 84,739 75,486 81,068 77, 397 
Narinduque 4,668 7,140 5,580 5,773 5,638 
Mas bate 12,583 15,572 13,069 13,206 13,867 
Nisamis Occidental 12,582 22,1+31 15,276 16,212 14,826 
ivlisa"'llis Oriental 11,916 20,846 15,679 15,088 14,450 
Mountain Province 14,477 11,820 10,950 7,991 7,199 
Negros Occidental 41,855 49,581 39,411 69,6o5 38,000 
Negros Oriental 19,026 35,361 27,410 35,540 28,239 
Nueva Ecija 22,217 14,242 14,993 10,022 11,714 
Nueva Vizcaya 8,354 4,674 7,407 3,371 3,956 
Occidental !1indoro 5,716 5,949 5,619 5,243 5,138 
Oriental Vdndoro 12,559 10,855 8,855 9,329 9,853 
Palawan 8,029 9,890 9,145 9,580 8,943 
Pampanga 34,735 10,106 7,287 6,601 7,303 
Pangasinan 122,839 81,213 104,874 67,789 69,4.05 
Quezon 37,322 17,908 17,204 16,155 18,027 
Rizal 85,644 40,135 33,766 32,802 39,087 
Romb1on 9,589 11,355 10,.301 11,119 9,963 II 
Samar 37,343 48,174 41,115 46,251 41,472 I 
Sorsogon 22, 51~ 26,371 21,759 22,967 23,045 I 
I 
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I PROVINCES PUYAT TOLENTINO BALAO DE LA ROSA LEDESivlA 
I Sulu 6,640 4,663 5,654 9,182 3,470 Surigao 37,263 33,611 30,351 16,314 31,620 I Tar lac 47,517 37,968 28,780 41,156 19,889 
Zam.bales 21,940 24,689 19,835 23,539 16,218 
Zam.boanga del Norte 20,958 18,068 17,083 6,217 17,801 
II Zamboanga del Sur 20,711 18,588 17,945 10,794 17,849 
CITIES 
I·'Ianila 102,555 146,908 101,441 103,231 61,447 
Bacolod 9,829 7,918 7,185 10,621 13,575 
Baguio 4,728 3,936 5,012 6,091 3,081 
Basil an 3,820 3,935 2,492 2,586 3,351 
Butuan 10,848 8,162 8, 716 6,842 8,066 
Cabanatuan 3,815 3,636 2,702 4,802 1,198 
Cagayan de Oro 5,733 4,342 4,288 3,719 4,540 
Calbayog 7,766 6,913 7,428 4,950 6,990 
Cavite 3,653 4,216 3,783 5,233 2,360 
Cabu 20,180 21,766 22,975 14,311 17,824 
Dagupan 7,263 6,958 6,333 8,474 4,999 
Davao 27,269 25,056 25,215 11,237 2!4, 519 
Dumaguete 3,971 3,596 3,650 2,237 3,810 
I ligan 7,054 5,237 5,376 3,131 5,029 
Iloilo 18,071 13,351 14,450 13,411 25,116 
Lipa 4,918 4,193 2,508 3,'188 2,989 
Mara1d 2,452 1,732 1,146 1,573 1,582 
Naga 3,640 2,668 2,539 4,146 2,229 
Ormoc 7,119 7,149 6,697 2,635 7,058 
Ozarnis 5,584 4,842 4,571 3,321 4,215 I 
Pasay 11,129 13,912 12,282 13,270 8,691 II Quezon 21,768 27,404 20,956 19,187 14,884 
Roxas 4,016 3,261 3,306 6,041 4,704 
,, 
San Pablo 6,340 5,656 3,634 6,116 1,578 II 
Silay 3,139 2,758 3,010 2,122 6,687 I Tacloban 6,763 6,549 6,250 3,624 5,725 I Tagaytay 1,098 1,054 1,029 285 918 
Trece Hartires 103 119 124 27 109 
II Za'llboanga 8,476 7,600 8,233 4,242 7,398 
T 0 T A L 2,189,909 1,982,708 1,851,157 l, 715,123 1,670,774 I I 
I 
II 
8 ? .I 
~ROVINCES PADILLA LIM PRDvliCIAS LOGS IN DELGADO ~ I 
I 
Sulu 6,992 10,244 3,362 3,668 3,101 
Surigao 16,046 32,637 28,697 24,698 27,815 
Tar lac 32,405 20,553 21,962 14;285 17,185 
Zambales 18,717 17,768 13,361 10,010 10,756 
Zamboanga del Norte 7,109 24,814 15,553 16,574 14,667 
Zamboanga del Sur. 8,506 26,890 16,925 16,501 14,115 
II 
CITIES 
" 
II 
Manila 138,642 57,913 42,986 38,489 50,342 I' Bacolod 9,734 5,866 4,300 10,375 3,364 
Baguio 7,399 1,797 2,669 1,413 1,605 I I Basil an 2,191 5, 739 2,833 2,721 2,492 
II Butuan 4,320 8,732 7,078 7,174 6,481 Cabanatuan 3,649 1,292 1,236 990 1,416 
Cagayan de Oro 4,533 4,493 3, 384 2, 768 2,835 
Calbayog 4,588 7,085 6,713 7, 273 6,958 
Cavite 4,779 2,507 1,768 1,640 1,994 
Cebu 18,928 17,182 15,631 17,933 16, 212 
Dagupan 9,457 5,293 6,305 4,871 4,981 
Davao 14,056 25,919 20,650 21,361 19,677 
Dtu-naguete 2,651 3,864 2,970 3,368 2,819 
!ligan 2,500 5,966 4,444 4,440 4, 592 
Iloilo 16,163 9,678 9,737 13,414 9,437 
Lip a 2,941 1,284 1,291 1,173 1,216 
lvlarawi 1,115 2,326 1,755 1,662 1,706 
Naga 3,758 1,579 9L;l 1,377 1,429 
Ormoc 2,533 7,290 6,340 5,688 6,431 
Ozamis 2,746 5,487 4,226 4,370 3,509 
Pasay 15,077 7,563 5,323 5,281 5,544 
Quezon 26,11.81 11,950 10,999 9,063 10,868 
Roxas 5,434 3,413 3,023 3,724 2,848 
San Pablo 5,824 1,204 1,232 907 1,856 
Silay 1,231 2,634 3,106 6,~2 2,261 
Ta.cloban 3,986 5,874 5,357 5,434 4, 744 
Tagaytay 264 845 691 771 852 
Trece Martires 20 92 78 8ft, 82 
Zamboanga 6,432 14,220 6,298 6,359 5,109 
T 0 T A L 1,636,202 1,558,322 1,350,863 1,347,797 l, 320,296 
Hy main concern was to give the final numbers of the win.ning candidates 
only . 
